Managing for Legitimacy: Agency Governance in Its “Deep” Constitutional Context

Recent literature on bureaucratic structure has gone further than studying discretions given to bureaucrats in policy making, and much attention is now paid to understanding how bureaucratic agencies are managed. This article proposes that the way in which executive governments manage their agencies varies according to their constitutional setting and that this relationship is driven by considerations of the executive's governing legitimacy. Inspired by Charles Tilly (1984), the authors compare patterns of agency governance in Hong Kong and Ireland, in particular, configurations of assigned decision‐making autonomies and control mechanisms. This comparison shows that in governing their agencies, the elected government of Ireland's parliamentary democracy pays more attention to input (i.e., democratic) legitimacy, while the executive government of Hong Kong's administrative state favors output (i.e., performance) legitimacy. These different forms of autonomy and control mechanism reflect different constitutional models of how political executives acquire and sustain their governing legitimacy.     

Competition and R&D cooperation with universities and competitors

This paper analyses the relationship between competitive environment and R&D cooperation with universities and competitors. Our simple model suggests that cooperation creates benefits in terms of synergies but also induces costs due to spillovers. Since the value of these synergies and spillovers depends on the competitive pressure, cooperation propensity depends on the competitive environment. Differentiating between the dimensions of competition, we hypothesize that university cooperation corresponds to quality competition, while horizontal cooperation relates to price competition. Furthermore, we predict that a higher number of competitors reduces the incentives for horizontal cooperation as it diminishes the gains from “collusion”. We test these hypotheses using Swiss firm-level panel data that allows us to control for simultaneity of cooperation decisions and endogeneity of competition. Our empirical analysis supports the relevance of distinguishing between competition dimensions and cooperation partners, respectively. We find that price competition has an influence on university cooperation in the form of an inverted U. Quality competition only has an influence on university cooperation and the relationship shows a U-form. Moreover, we see that the number of principal competitors reduces cooperation between competitors.     

Pürgy, Erich: Natura 2000. Auswirkung und Umsetzung im innerstaatlichen Recht, Forschungen aus Staat und Recht 142. 2005, 398 S., brosch., € 78,–/sFr 129,–, Springer Verlag, Wien New York. ISBN 3-211-28251-3

Ohne Zusammenfassung