Summit diplomacy of the seventeenth century: William III and Peter I in Utrecht and London, 1697–98

This article evaluates the meetings of the Russian Tsar Peter I and the English King William III in 1697–98 as the high point of Russia's 18‐month Great Embassy to western Europe. The emphasis is on the diplomatic aspects of Anglo‐Russian summits as well as on their results for international relations and diplomacy in Europe with particular focus on dramatic changes in Russia's attitude to international cooperation. Reform of Russian diplomatic machinery, enacted by Peter I as a follow‐up of his European journey, were as well to a great degree motivated by his personal contacts with William III and his English and Dutch diplomatic advisors. Based on British and Russian archival sources, the article attempts to prove that Anglo‐Russian summitry, and, in the first place, the rendezvous in Utrecht (1 September 1697, old style), signified Russia's intention to acquiesce to the raison d'etat principle in international relations and in practical diplomatic behaviour, thus abandoning religious and political prejudices that had kept Russians on the periphery of European diplomacy.     

From ‘feckless pluralism’ to ‘dominant power politics’? The transformation of Russia's party system

The transformation of Russia's party system demonstrates a trend towards a decrease in party competition since the establishment of the party of power, United Russia, which claims to have become the dominant party. These developments are unique among post-Soviet countries, which merely attempted to create personalist, rather than party-based, monopolies of ruling elites. Why have Russia's elites opted to build a party-based monopoly and what are the prospects of this enterprise? The formation of the ruling group's party-based monopoly is explained with the help of a part-contingent model of an interrelated chain of causes and effects: (1) open electoral conflict among elites; (2) forced instrumental use of political parties as tools by the elites, in this conflict; (3) elite conflict turned into a zero-sum game; (4) a set of incentives for the ruling elite to make further instrumental use of the party of power; (5) an effective constellation of ideological and organizational resources of the party of power. The article also analyses the benefits and risks of the dominance of the party of power and its possible role in the consolidation of a non-democratic regime in Russia, along lines comparable to the Institutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico.     

The Politics of Fear

The article attempts to analyze the mechanisms of political control used by the Kremlin vis-à-vis its rivals. Russian authorities had opted the politics of fear, which include overt intimidation and public discrediting of the regime's critics, and selective persecution and open harassment of opposition activists and/or supporters. This approach to political control to some degree reproduced similar mechanisms that had enabled regime survival in the late-Soviet period, and fit general trends of repressive policies in a number of contemporary authoritarian regimes. The article discusses causes and mechanisms of the politics of fear in contemporary Russia, its roots in comparative and historical contexts, and strengths and weaknesses of repressive policy in Russia from the viewpoints of the regime, the opposition, and Russian society.     

中俄能源领域合作前景:消除壁垒加强联系

鉴于中俄未来数十年的油气需求和俄罗斯作为世界能源出口大国的事实,中俄两国将在能源领域开展更深入、更广泛的合作与外来是显而易见的趋势.表面看,中俄能源合作似乎发展很顺利,但跨国能源投资机制等始终制约着中俄关系在能源领域的进展.俄应将哈萨克斯坦作为前苏联国家与中国油气公司成功合作的典范而加以关注.为了达到更好的效果,中俄必须汲取以往教训,采取行动清除令中俄能源关系发展天然潜力难以实现的障碍.     

Putin as a flexible politician. Does he imitate Stalin?

The article is about Putin's ‘Jewish anomaly’. Against all expectations, Putin during his tenure as president of the Russian Federation showed in various ways his concern about the life of Jews in his country.     

China in the Russian mind today: Ambivalence and defeatism

This article describes the ambivalence of Russian attitudes toward China at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Russians of all strata combine a willingness to see China as a friendly neighbour with a high level of fear of the giant that could swallow much of the country whole, especially the Asian part. The article pays special attention to the split in Russian views of China among elites. While some elites, who have strong anti-American attitudes, see China as a major ally against the United States, others call on the government to treat the United States as the single force that can help Russia protect the integrity of its territory against China, whose people still do not recognise the existing borders between the two countries.