Nationalising International Theory: Race,Class and the English School

Much work has been done to deconstruct the links between knowledge and power in IR as "an American Social Science". This topic has arisen again with the re- launching of the English School of IR Theory in 2001. This essay argues that although the English School is critical of the power-knowledge dynamic, it actually exacerbates the problem by deliberately "nationalising" international theory. The essay traces the emergence and logic of the English School and its key concept "International Society". It argues that the English School is tied not only to national identity but to the rules of European Empire. Using the case of International Society's intervention in China, the essay shows how International Society uses "standards of civilisation" to draw borders between the subjects and objects of IR. But rather than tracing civilisation/empire to racial/national differentiation, the essay argues that "class" is used to differentiate between aristocratic member states of the club of International Society, and lower class colonies outside Europe. In other words, rather than looking to international ethics to regulate world politics, International Society relies on aristocratic etiquette for world ordering. Hence the theory is not as radical as its promoters suggest; rather, by limiting theoretical discussion to nation-states, the English School is a conservative confederate of other state-centric approaches to world politics. To do this, the essay looks beyond Eurocentric discourse and high diplomacy; it engages in a comparative IR theory that uses a new set of texts from China and the popular culture of manners.     

TOWARD A MACRO-SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF GENERAL DETERRENCE

This paper is focused on the problem of general deterrence as a macro-sociological phenomenon. An attempt has been made to integrate existing literature into a set of testable hypotheses Three perspectives on general deterrence are examined, including the classical school of criminology and the positions of Durkheim and Sumner. The variables of certainty and seventy, type of threatened behavior, latent deterrent functions of legal threats, and normative structure are discussed. It is suggested that compliance rates may be used as an empirical index of general deterrence.     

DETERRENCE, BRUTALIZATION, AND THE DEATH PENALTY: ANOTHER EXAMINATION OF OKLAHOMA'S RETURN TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

A replication and extension of a weekly ARZMA analysis (1989–1991) by Cochran et al. (1994), which appeared in Criminology, confirms that Oklahoma's return to capital punishment in 1990, after a 25-year moratorium, was followed by a significant increase in killings involving strangers. Moreover, a multivariate autoregressive analysis, which includes measures of the frequency of executions, the level of print media attention devoted to executions, and selected sociodemographic variables, produced results consistent with the brutalization hypothesis for total homicides, as well as a variety of different types of killing involving both strangers and nonstrangers. No prior study has shown such strong support for the capital punishment and brutalization argument. However, there is also a suggestion of a possible lagged deterrent effect for the level of media coverage of executions for nonfelony murders involving strangers. The analysis indicates that the impact of capital punishment in Oklahoma during the 1989–1991 period was much more extensive than suggested by the earlier study. Recommendations are made for further research examining additional jurisdictions and time periods to determine the generalizability of the patterns found for Oklahoma.     

Political Trust and Judicial Retention Elections

Retention elections are that part of the merit selection plan designed to hold judges accountable to the public. While more than one scholar has concluded that votes cast in a retention election are often not informed evaluations of the judge's qualifications and/or conduct on the bench, the few existing systematic empirical studies have failed to explain why people vote for or against retention. This study fills part of this void by testing the hypothesis that political trust is a major cue in judicial retention voting. In contrast to most previous work which was either limited to the appellate level or to elections in a single state, the data set consists of 1,864 retention elections held from 1964 through 1984 for major trial court judges. The national trends in political trust in the last two decades are found to be reflected in the trends in the mean vote for retention.     

THE IMPACT OF MEDICAL RESOURCES ON CRIMINALLY INDUCED LETHALITY: A FURTHER EXAMINATION*

A recent addition to the literature on the ecology of homicide is the explanation offered by Doerner and Speir (1986) that the differential distribution of medical resources is partially responsible for variation in criminally induced lethality. Unfortunately, that analysis was hampered by data that did not adequately measure crucial concepts. Consequently, this study reanalyzes homicide data for Florida in conjunction with a more detailed medical data base. The results indicate that medical resources, particularly emergency transportation, do affect the distribution of criminally induced lethality.     

AFRICAN WEAK STATES AND COMMERCIAL ALLIANCES

Conventional analyses of Africa's ‘failed states’conclude that patronage networks fragment as state resourcesdecline. As payoffs from rulers decline, once-loyal strongmenbecome warlords, attacking centralized authority. This articleexamines how rulers of weak states actually manage increasinglythreatening patronage networks. The cases of Angola and SierraLeone show how rulers use more reliable foreign mining firmsand foreign private (mercenary) armies to marginalize threateningstrongmen. At home, militarising commerce denies its benefitsto enterprising strongmen. Rulers then receive creditor financialsupport for their offensives against elements of their old patronagenetwork and insurgencies, seeming to battle corruption and inefficiency.Rulers discover that they can use foreign firms to collect revenue,defend territory and conduct diplomacy with other states andmultilateral agencies more reliably then domestic bureaucratsor strongmen whose political authority may threaten their own.This new political alliance increases the economic viabilityof some weak states. Paradoxically, the destruction of conventionalstate institutions eases the hard pressed ruler's efforts torecruit aid from global society and manage the demands of competitionin global markets.