Are older deafblind people being left behind? A narrative review of literature on deafblindness through the lens of the United Nations Principles for Older People

Underpinned by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRDP), Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is the international goal to ‘leave no one behind’. However, the World Federation of the Deafblind have argued that deafblind people have been excluded from international welfare and disability development programmes. Despite making up the majority of the deafblind population, it appears that older deafblind people are particularly invisible. The paper builds on the earlier work of others, which translated the UN Principles for Older Persons into the language of older visually impaired adults, by using them here as the lens for a narrative review of the literature on older deafblind people. It argues that existing research demonstrates that older deafblind people are not only being ‘left behind’ in benefitting from implementation of the UN Principles, but also that the focus of the UN Principles themselves risks maintaining or enhancing their exclusion. Further research and policy development with older deafblind people is required to ensure that international and national social welfare policies and provision are not nugatory to the older deafblind population.     

Literatur

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Der Biodiversitätsschaden nach 21a des Bundesnaturschutzgesetzes

Zusammenfassung Im Mai 2007 wurde das Gesetzes zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie des Europ?ischen Parlaments und des Rates über die Umwelthaftung zur Vermeidung und Sanierung von Umweltsch?den verabschiedet, das seinerseits die Umwelt-Haftungsrichtlinie (UH-RL) in deutsches Recht umsetzt. Auf Grund von Art. 72 Abs. 3 S. 2 GG treten Gesetze auf dem Gebiet des Naturschutzes mit Ausnahme der abweichungsfesten Teile frühestens 6 Monate nach Verkündung in Kraft. Folglich sieht Art. 4 des Gesetzes vom 10. Mai 2007 vor, dass das Umweltschadensgesetz (USchadG) und die ?nderungen im Wasserhaushaltsgesetz und im Bundesnaturschutzgesetz zum 14. November 2007 in Kraft getreten sind.     

A peculiar institution? Greco–Roman monogamy in global context

In what sense were the ancient Greeks and Romans monogamous, and why does it matter? This paper addresses this question from a transdisciplinary and global cross-cultural perspective. It considers the physical and anthropological record of polygyny, delineates the historical expansion of formal monogamy, and critiques complementary social science models of mate choice. This approach allows us to situate Greco–Roman practice on a spectrum from traditional polygamy to more recent forms of normative monogyny. Whilst Greco–Roman legal and social norms stressed the nexus between monogamous unions and legitimate reproduction, they accommodated a variety of men's polygynous relationships outside the nuclear family. Greco–Roman monogamy's historically most significant consequence was its role in shaping Christian and later ‘Western’ marital norms that eventually gained global influence.     

Explaining the number of rebel groups in civil wars

Why do multiple rebel groups form in some civil wars but not others? Since 1946, only half of all civil wars were fought by a single rebel group; the rest were fought by multiple groups. This article argues that this variation is determined by the incentives political entrepreneurs have to enter a war. The higher the demand for political change and the lower the costs of fighting, the more incentives entrepreneurs have to form their own group. Analyzing UCDP data for all civil wars between 1946 and 2015 I find that the two measures of demand – the number of identifiable ethnic or religious groups in a country and the size of the disgruntled population – have the most consistent effects, but that key measures of costs such as the size of the government military also matter. A detailed analysis of the Ethiopian case further reveals the influence of external intervention on the formation of rebel groups. These results suggest that rebel groups emerge in civil wars in rational, predictable ways related to the ease by which rebel elites can mobilize separate groups for fighting.