Social Change, Values and Political Agency: The Case of the Third Way

The third way is based on both sociological claims about a changed world, and normative propositions about appropriate conduct within that world. Four types of claim concerning the relationship between social change and political values are identified within third way advocacy. In each case, the degree of political agency implied is assessed. This ranges from a position which minimises the room for political interventions in the face of social change, to one which gives primacy to the role of political values. A successful third way project, or alternative, needs not only to be grounded in contemporary social change, but also to show how to steer it.     

Does the Network Centrality of Government Actors Matter? Examining the Role of Government Organizations in Aquaculture Partnerships

The growth in the use of collaborative governance arrangements has been accompanied by burgeoning scholarship in the field of public affairs that seeks to understand the benefits of engaging diverse stakeholders in common venues. However, few scholars have formally assessed the role of government actors in facilitating outcomes for individual participants in such efforts. Moreover, little work on collaborative governance examines how individual incentives and barriers to collective action are formed within the nested nature of these contexts. We contribute to the study of collaborative governance by formally investigating how the relative centrality of government actors in collaborative policy‐making venues affects individual relationship building and learning for participants therein. We find that government actor centrality is positively associated with relationship building and learning. However, in testing two different conceptualizations of “centrality,” we find that the definition of this construct clearly matters.     

The Realism of Universals in Plato and Nyāya

It has become commonplace in introductions to Indian philosophy to construe Plato’s discussion of forms (εἶδος/ἰδέα) and the treatment in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika of universals (sāmānya/jāti) as addressing the same philosophical issue, albeit in somewhat different ways. While such a comparison of the similarities and differences has interest and value as an initial reconnaissance of what each says about common properties, an examination of the roles that universals play in the rest of their philosophical enquiries vitiates this commonplace. This paper draws upon the primary texts to identify the following metaphysical, epistemological, semantic and soteriological roles that universals play in the philosophy of Plato and of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika:

Metaphysical: causal of the existence of x Metaphysical: constitutive of the identity/essence of x Epistemological: cognitively causal (i.e. of the cognition of one over many) Epistemological: epistemically causal (i.e. of knowledge of x) Semantic: necessary condition of speech and reason Epistemological: vindicatory of induction (Nyāya only) Metaphysical: explanatory of causation (Nyāya only) Soteriological: cathartic contemplation (Plato only)

These roles provide us with motivations or reasons to believe that universals exist. As we examine these motivations, we find pressures mounting against our assimilating Platonic forms and the universals of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika in the discourse about common properties. It is especially when we appreciate the utterly different contribution that universals make in securing our highest welfare that we realize how Plato and the two sister schools are not so much talking somewhat differently about the same thing, but talking somewhat similarly about different things. This better understanding of this difference in these philosophies opens a route for our better understanding of their unique contributions in the ongoing dialogue of philosophy.     

The Untimely Stevie Smith

Abstract

This essay considers the role of the untimely in the work of Stevie Smith. It explores motifs of belatedness in her reception history, suggesting how her own authorial persona and public presentation encodes this response. It examines the notion of the last-minute in her work, focusing on motifs such as disruption, elongation and delay. It suggests how her revision practice responded to the idea of being ‘too late’, with the moment of publication providing her with further prompts to revise her work. It focuses on final words and endings in her poetry and frames her interest in Christianity through ideas of temporality and form.