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81.
Wolfgang Pape 《European Law Journal》1999,5(4):438-460
The purpose of this study is to explore socio-cultural divergence¹ among contracting parties, members and potential candidates that could favour or complicate the establishment of an effective² set of common competition rules at World Trade Organisation (WTO) level. Therefore, the focus is on historical, religious, ideological and systemic differences in relation to competition rules that might otherwise be overlooked during the negotiations, but later prove crucial or even detrimental to the actual implementation of thus only formally common international rules. 相似文献
82.
Wolfgang Seibel 《Politische Vierteljahresschrift》2002,43(1):1-2
83.
Wolfgang Seibel 《Politische Vierteljahresschrift》2002,43(1):142-146
Ohne Zusammenfassung
Besprechungsessay zu Gunnar Folke Schuppert: Verwaltungswissenschaft. Verwaltung, Verwaltungsrecht, Verwaltungslehre. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2000, 1023
S., DM 187,-/95,61 Euro. 相似文献
84.
Wolfgang C. MÜLLER 《European Journal of Political Research》1986,14(1-2):63-80
Abstract. Three strategies which may emerge out of politicians' concepts of rationality (problems solving, agenda management, creation of consensus) are applied to one of the main features of Austrian politics, namely the differentation of policy sectors dominated either by political parties or interest groups. The Equal Treatment Act, which had been transferred from the corporatist arena to the arena of the party system, involved the rationalities of both political parties and interest groups. This paper analyses the 'extended' process of legislation of this law (including implementation). The empirical findings are then linked to the theoretical propositions about the rationalities of the respective political actors. Finally, hypotheses about the conditions of issue transfers from the corporatist arena into the arena of the party system are suggested. 相似文献
85.
Unification posed a new challenge to the Federal Republic ofGermany. Two economically different areas were united into onefederal polity. Due to the constitutional command to safeguardequivalency of living conditions throughout the republic, thefederal government as well as the "old" Länder were supposedto support the "new" Länder of East Germany. Until 1994,provisional regulations served to finance East Germany; in 1995,the new Länder were integrated on an equal footing intothe "financial constitution" of the Basic Law. Unification wasnot used for constitutional reform as had been demanded by someLand leaders. Concerning intergovernmental fiscal relations,one can speak of "budgetary adaptation" only. It was not possibleto resolve long-lasting constitutional issues together withthe challenge of unification. German unification has been, andwill be, very costly. Public debt rose from roughly 900 billionGerman marks in 1989 to more than two trillion in 1995. Theargument about burden sharing between the federation and the"old" Länder continues, and the formulas of fiscal equalizationhave been challenges by Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg. 相似文献
86.
Why Measure Performance? Different Purposes Require Different Measures 总被引:22,自引:0,他引:22
Robert D. Behn 《Public administration review》2003,63(5):586-606
Performance measurement is not an end in itself. So why should public managers measure performance? Because they may find such measures helpful in achieving eight specific managerial purposes. As part of their overall management strategy, public managers can use performance measures to evaluate, control, budget, motivate, promote, celebrate, learn, and improve. Unfortunately, no single performance measure is appropriate for all eight purposes. Consequently, public managers should not seek the one magic performance measure. Instead, they need to think seriously about the managerial purposes to which performance measurement might contribute and how they might deploy these measures. Only then can they select measures with the characteristics necessary to help achieve each purpose. Without at least a tentative theory about how performance measures can be employed to foster improvement (which is the core purpose behind the other seven), public managers will be unable to decide what should be measured. 相似文献
87.
Wolfgang Leininger 《Public Choice》2009,140(3-4):341-356
We define an indirect evolutionary approach formally and apply it to (Tullock) contests. While it is known that the direct evolutionary approach in the form of finite population ESS yields more aggressive behavior than in Nash equilibrium, it is now shown that the indirect evolutionary approach yields the same more aggressive behavior, too. This holds for any population size N, if the evolution of preferences is determined by behavior in two-player contests. The evolutionarily stable preferences (ESP) of the indirect approach turn out to be negatively interdependent, thereby “rationalizing” the more aggressive behavior. 相似文献
88.
89.
Financial assistance provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other International Financial Institutions (IFIs)
aims to help member countries reduce their economic policy distortions. Because these distortions are endogenously generated,
it is important to understand how IFI assistance interacts with the domestic political economy. In this paper, we review recent
models of IFI conditional assistance that are based on the theory of special interest politics (Grossman and Helpman 2001).
In these models, governments adopt inefficient economic policies and instruments because of lobbying by interest groups. IFI
assistance helps reduce these inefficiencies, at least under perfect and symmetric information, and provided IFIs are representative
of the general public in creditor and debtor countries. Factors limiting the effectiveness of conditional assistance as an
incentive system are also identified. These are related to information asymmetries, the potential for political instability
in debtor countries, and the IFIs’ own financial solvency.
相似文献
Alex Mourmouras (Corresponding author)Email: |
90.