Delegation without Agency Loss? The Use of Performance Contracts in Danish Central Government

Performance contracts entered between ministerial departments and their agencies are used throughout the Danish central government. The article analyzes the use of performance contracting in 2005. The analysis draws on transaction cost theory and actor-centered institutionalism, stressing the bargaining aspect of hierarchy and the importance of economic and political transaction costs. The analysis shows considerable variation in the content of performance demands. Ministries with different organizational designs use contracts in markedly different ways and agencies with a strong interface to individual citizens and businesses are more likely to meet demands regulating policy delivery and service levels. Further, contracts contain substantive clauses, the terms of which are largely assessable. It also shows that performance contracts only rarely specify demands related to cost efficiency within agencies. Many of these results are statistically significant, even though a general point is the wide variation in the implementation of performance contracts between individual ministries.     

The opinion-policy nexus in Europe and the role of political institutions

A strong link between citizen preferences and public policy is one of the key goals and criteria of democratic governance. Yet, our knowledge about the extent to which public policies on specific issues are in line with citizen preferences in Europe is limited. This article reports on the first study of the link between public opinion and public policy that covers a large and diverse sample of concrete public policy issues in 31 European democracies. The findings demonstrate a strong positive relationship and a substantial degree of congruence between public opinion and the state of public policy. Also examined is whether political institutions, including electoral systems and the horizontal and vertical division of powers, influence the opinion-policy link. The evidence for such effects is very limited, which suggests that the same institutions might affect policy representation in countervailing ways through different mechanisms.     

COMPULSORY COMPETITIVE TENDERING FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES: THE EXPERIENCES OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN THE NORTH OF ENGLAND 1988-1992

This article examines the response of a sample of local authorities in the North of England to the introduction of Compulsory Competitive Tendering (Cm) following the 1988 Local Government Act. It analyses the Organizational implications of CCT and highlights how officers, councillors and trade union representatives viewed the changing nature of management within local authorities in the period following the award of the first service contracts. In particular, it examines the different reactions to the development of a more commercial approach to the management of services and ends by assessing the specific impact of CCT in the context of other important changes in local government.