The dynamics of interest group evaluations of Congress

We apply a dynamic spatial model to interest group ratings of the members of Congress over the period 1959–1981. Spatial distances between an interest group and the members of Congress are assumed to be monotonic with the ratings. Our pooled cross-sectional time-series data set consists of 203,387 ratings by 59 interest groups. We restrict the spatial coordinates of the interest groups and members of Congress to be polynomial functions of time. Two significant dimensions are recovered: the first dimension, which accounts for approximately 75% of the variance, represents liberal-conservative positions on economic issues; the second dimension, which accounts for approximately an additional 5% of the variance, represents liberal-conservative positions on social issues. Nearly all the interest groups and most members of Congress are ideologically consistent. They are either liberal on both dimensions or conservative on both.     

The impact of at-large elections: vote dilution or choice dilution?

Multi-member, at-large legislative elections result in election outcomes different from outcomes in single-member district elections for two reasons: they cancel out the voting strength of geographically concentrated groups of voters (e.g., party groups, racial groups), and they make it difficult for a voter to vote for an individual candidate, rather than for one of the competing lists of candidates. An electoral setting in Long Island, New York, presents an opportunity to test which of these two aspects of at-large elections—vote dilution or choice dilution—accounts for the usual pattern of one party (or group) winning all the legislative seats at stake.     

Linking program implementation and effectiveness: Lessons from a pooled sample of welfare‐to‐work experiments

This paper addresses the question: How does implementation influence the effectiveness of mandatory welfare‐to‐work programs? Data from three large‐scale, multi‐site random assignment experiments were pooled; quantitative measures of program implementation were constructed; and multilevel statistical modeling was used to examine the relationship between program implementation and effects on short‐term client earnings. Individual‐level data were analyzed for 69,399 sample members and group‐level implementation data were analyzed for 59 local programs. Findings indicate that, other things being equal, earnings effects are increased by: an emphasis on quick client employment, an emphasis on personalized client attention, staff caseloads that do not get too large, and limited use of basic education. Findings also show that mandatory welfare‐to‐work programs can be effective for many types of people, and that focusing on clients who are especially job‐ready (or not) does not have a consistent influence on a program's effectiveness. © 2003 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

The Ombudsman: What's in a Name?

The role of the ombudsman is perhaps the least well understood inthe field of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). This essay introducesreaders to the differing conceptions of the role; the sometimes fractiousdivide that has existed in the past between classical andorganizational ombudsmen; and a collection of essays by four well-known practitioners that shed lighton what it is ombudsmen do; the kinds of disputes they deal with and howthey operate; how they view their role (and how others view it); and boththe possibilities and limitations of the ombuds function.     

Federal tax reform and the financing of state and local governments

Although the Reagan Administration tax reform proposals would reduce federal income tax liabilities for most taxpayers, federal tax reform would also create strong pressures on state and local governments to cut taxes and public services. These pressures would arise primarily because itemizers would no longer be able to deduct state and local taxes in determining their federal income tax liabilities. In New York City and Boston, it is likely that the Administration's tax reform would induce cuts in spending that range from 2.5 to 7.5 percent. While the elimination of state and local tax deductibility may promote allocative efficiency in the provision of local public goods, the cost would be a decline in the degree of redistribution through the state and local public sector, and a reduction in local public services for the poor.