Non-farm Income and Employment in Rural Honduras: Assessing the Role of Locational Factors

This article emphasises the role of locational factors in the determination of rural non-farm (RNF) employment possibilities in rural Honduras. It finds that while RNF wage jobs are predominantly located close to urban areas, RNF self-employment jobs are geographically dispersed around the country, depending on local motors such as a profitable agricultural activity, an important road, or a tourist attraction. In all, the importance of RNF income for rural households (31.3 per cent of total income) suggests that the RNF sector should be considered when designing policies to improve the capabilities and livelihood of the rural Honduran.     

Internal dealing regulation and insiders’ trades in the Italian financial market

We analyze insiders’ trades in the Italian financial market. Insiders buy undervalued stocks, but they also act as positive feedback traders. They exploit short term market movements with abnormal returns around trades: they purchase (sell) stocks after a price decline (increase) and trades are followed by a partial reversal. They time the market mainly through purchases immediately communicated to the market and sales (and in part purchases) communicated quarterly to the market. It seems that insiders do not manipulate the market but strategically choose the size of trades, while they are interested to disclose immediately purchases of the assets of the company they prefer not to do it in case of sales. JEL Classification: G14, G15     

Structural reform,institutions and earnings: Evidence from the formal and informal sectors in urban Peru

Reforms undertaken in Peru in the early 1990s might have resulted in a slight reduction of the informal sector. Costs associated with becoming and staying informal, and benefits of becoming formal might have increased. This, when a legalistic definition of informality is used. Earnings differentials between formal and informal self‐employed workers are negligible although they persist between formal and informal salaried workers. Skilled workers are more likely to be found in the formal sector and informal wage earners tend to be younger and less skilled. The earnings generating process for both the formal and the informal self‐employed workers is similar.     

Child pornography possessors: Comparisons and contrasts with contact- and non-contact sex offenders

Abstract

The advent of the internet has facilitated a dramatic increase in the number of individuals accessing and possessing child pornography and a corresponding increase in referrals for assessment and treatment. Questions remain regarding whether child pornography possessors are more similar to or different from other types of sex offenders, and whether or not assessment and treatment protocols for contact and non-contact sex offenders are applied appropriately to child pornography offenders. The present study compared 50 child pornography offenders, 45 non-contact sex offenders and 101 contact child molesters. The results indicated that the three groups were more similar than different; however, child pornography offenders were distinguished by greater academic and vocational achievement, fewer childhood behaviour problems and by select relational variables. Recidivism rates were low for all groups.     

苏东地区“现实社会主义”的垮台和当前社会主义计划的重新制定

前言 自社会主义作为理论和政治实践出现以来，一直是人们思考和分析的问题。在整个20世纪，不同国家的社会主义革命补充了社会主义计划具体形成的根本问题并对已经出现的社会主义经验做出评价，其中一些经验继续朝着乐观的方向发展。     

Institutionalizing uncertainty: the choice of electoral formulas

Taken from an infinite set of divisors methods, the D’Hondt formula is the unique rule that maximizes the minimum number of seats for parties exceeding average size but not surpassing an absolute majority of the votes. This property is also shared, in the quota set of methods, by the Droop formula. At the same time, these two methods are those most commonly observed in practice. This paper relates the property stated to the observed facts. If parties try to maximize the minimum number of seats for a given share of votes, then the D’Hondt formula should be chosen. This choice is consistent with rational parties that make institutional choices in an uncertain environment.     

Regulation as a cause of firm fragmentation:the case of the Spanish construction industry

Team members organize their relationships to achieve efficient incentives in accordance with institutional constraints. When these constraints change, the rights and tasks of members are reallocated, generating a new contractual structure [or governance mechanism] that solves more easily the problem of collective action associated with team production. We show how this process has worked in the case of Spanish construction firms, in which more restrictive labor and tax regulations have induced parties to substitute market contracts for labor contracts because of the need to avoid moral hazards. We argue that this explains the increased fragmentation of the Spanish construction industry, and technical change does not seem to account for this process.     

Electoral Manipulation as Bureaucratic Control

Bureaucratic compliance is often crucial for political survival, yet eliciting that compliance in weakly institutionalized environments requires that political principals convince agents that their hold on power is secure. We provide a formal model to show that electoral manipulation can help to solve this agency problem. By influencing beliefs about a ruler's hold on power, manipulation can encourage a bureaucrat to work on behalf of the ruler when he would not otherwise do so. This result holds under various common technologies of electoral manipulation. Manipulation is more likely when the bureaucrat is dependent on the ruler for his career and when the probability is high that even generally unsupportive citizens would reward bureaucratic effort. The relationship between the ruler's expected popularity and the likelihood of manipulation, in turn, depends on the technology of manipulation.     

Examining Deterrence and Backlash Effects in Counter-Terrorism: The Case of ETA

Scholars are increasingly drawing on models and theories from the field of Criminology to offer new insights on terrorist violence. A particularly useful framework by LaFree, Dugan, and Korte works from the assumption that illegal behaviour can be affected by the threat and/or imposition of punishment. It sees the results of the government's intervention in terms of deterrence (state's repressive action leads to a reduction in terrorism violence), and backlash (state's repressive action leads to defiance and retaliation, and to an upsurge of terrorism violence). This article applies this model to a case study of the government's responses to Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). It uses a variation of survival analysis technique—Series Hazard—to assess the impact of six major initiatives on the risk of new ETA attacks in the period from 1977 to 2010. Mostly, the results provide support for both backlash interpretations, although important questions regarding interpretation are raised.