Investigating the determinants of pretrial settlement rates: contingent versus non-contingent lawyers’ fees

In this article, we explore the possibility that the percentage of litigations settled outside of court is affected by the degree of contingency of lawyers’ fees. In our view, a litigation is a game where not only the plaintiff and the defendant, but also their lawyers are independent players. The main consequence of this assumption is that the authority to settle is allocated endogenously to either the clients or their lawyers, depending on the value of the relevant parameters. In this game theoretical setup, (1) we compare the incentives to settle provided by contingent and non-contingent lawyers’ fees, and (2) we state the conditions under which settlement is more likely to happen.      

Chromatic Variation of Soot Soiling: A Possible Marker for Gunshot Wounds in Burnt Bone

Soot soiling is a crucial forensic parameter around gunshot lesions. Carbonization, however, can severely alter human tissues and mimic such clues. This study aims at evaluating the survival of soot soiling even after carbonization in bone. A total of 36 bovine ribs (half fleshed and half defleshed) were shot with two types of bullet (both 9‐mm; full metal‐jacketed and unjacketed) with a near‐contact range. With unjacketed bullets, the shot left in every case a clear, black, and roughly round soot stain around the entrance wound, whereas full metal‐jacketed bullets left no signs of soot. Every specimen then underwent calcination in an oven at 800°C. The analysis of the charred samples clearly showed the survival of the soot soiling in both fleshed and bony samples, with a clear correspondence with the former position, but with a different color (yellow). Thus, soot soiling may survive, although with a different color, even after charring.     

The contribution of lobby regulation initiatives in addressing political corruption in Latin America

For most of its history, Latin America has lived under authoritarian and elite rule where public decisions were often crafted in the shadows by cabinets and parliaments to the benefit of a small minority. Recently, the development of participatory political systems has brought some transparency to the policy-making process. Such scrutiny reveals evidence of the capture of aspects of policy-making by private interests that use obscure strategies to achieve their political goals. As a consequence, a widespread movement for regulating the role and tactics of interest groups emerged, which is seen as a necessary step to address the root causes of political corruption. This article provides an overview of efforts to regulate lobbying in Latin America. It explains attempts at regulation in four countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru), evaluates the level of success of these efforts, and assesses prospects for the future regarding reducing corruption through the instrument of lobby regulations. The authors argue that such regulations alone cannot eliminate political corruption. However, lobby regulations can contribute to increased transparency and aid in developing an anti-corruption culture. It will be shown that lobby laws in Latin America exhibit many of the problems long identified with similar regulations across western democracies. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Where it all starts: Lobbying,democracy and the Public Interest

The article is a theoretical and semantic analysis of the concept of Public Interest. It starts with a focus on the ambiguity of the concepts of interest and public, whose different interpretations directly impact the understanding of the expression “Public Interest.” An examination follows of the most important contributions in the literature on the idea of Public Interest. A distinction is then drawn between the concept and different conceptions of it. In particular, I propose a typology of five ideal–typical conceptions of the Public Interest: formal, substantive, realist, aggregative, and procedural. For each conception, I highlight the constitutive elements and the relevant consequences in their respective visions of democracy and of lobbying. Some expectations are finally advanced on the uses of the various conceptions in actual policymaking contexts.     

Loss Aversion in Politics

We study loss aversion in elections by investigating a median voter model (full convergence in a two‐candidate election) and a model of partial divergence of policy proposals. First, we show a status quo bias, an endowment effect, and a moderating effect of policies. Second, we show the occurrence of “long‐term cycles” in policies with self‐supporting movements to the right or the left. Finally, we prove that younger societies should be more prone to change and less affected by the status quo bias than older ones.     

Tax Amnesty as Price-Discriminating Behavior by a Monopolistic Government

We consider perfectly anticipated periodic tax amnesties characterized by a tax rate lower than the ordinary one and used by a monopolistic government to maximize net fiscal revenue. We model tax amnesties as a form of intertemporal price discrimination. It turns out that, under certain conditions, discrimination secures the highest net revenue, as amnesties incorporate a self-selection mechanism that renders it possible to collect additional payments from tax evaders, without inducing honest taxpayers to join them. Optimal timing for granting tax amnesties may be calculated, but problems of time inconsistency in government behavior may arise.