Constitutional democracy and the legitimacy of judicial review

It has long been argued that the institution of judicial review is incompatible with democratic institutions. This criticism usually relies on a procedural conception of democracy, according to which democracy is essentially a form of government defined by equal political rights and majority rule. I argue that if we see democracy not just as a form of government, but more basically as a form of sovereignty, then there is a way to conceive of judicial review as a legitimate democratic institution. The conception of democracy that stems from the social contract tradition of Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Rawls, is based in an ideal of the equality, independence, and original political jurisdiction of all citizens. Certain equal basic rights, in addition to equal political rights, are a part of democratic sovereignty. In exercising their constituent power at the level of constitutional choice, free and equal persons could choose judicial review as one of the constitutional mechanisms for protecting their equal basic rights. As such, judicial review can be seen as a kind of shared precommitment by sovereign citizens to maintaining their equal status in the exercise of their political rights in ordinary legislative procedures. I discuss the conditions under which judicial review is appropriate in a constitutional democracy. This argument is contrasted with Hamilton's traditional argument for judicial review, based in separation of powers and the nature of judicial authority. I conclude with some remarks on the consequences for constitutional interpretation.I am indebted to John Rawls and Burton Dreben for their helpful advice and their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.     

Advances in Bayesian Time Series Modeling and the Study of Politics: Theory Testing, Forecasting, and Policy Analysis

John R. Freeman Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota, 267 19th Avenue, Minneapolis, MN 55455 e-mail: pbrandt{at}utdallas.edu (corresponding author) e-mail: freeman{at}polisci.umn.edu Bayesian approaches to the study of politics are increasinglypopular. But Bayesian approaches to modeling multiple time serieshave not been critically evaluated. This is in spite of thepotential value of these models in international relations,political economy, and other fields of our discipline. We reviewrecent developments in Bayesian multi-equation time series modelingin theory testing, forecasting, and policy analysis. Methodsfor constructing Bayesian measures of uncertainty of impulseresponses (Bayesian shape error bands) are explained. A referenceprior for these models that has proven useful in short- andmedium-term forecasting in macroeconomics is described. Oncemodified to incorporate our experience analyzing political dataand our theories, this prior can enhance our ability to forecastover the short and medium terms complex political dynamics likethose exhibited by certain international conflicts. In addition,we explain how contingent Bayesian forecasts can be constructed,contingent Bayesian forecasts that embody policy counterfactuals.The value of these new Bayesian methods is illustrated in areanalysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict of the 1980s.     

The different worlds of women and men: Attitudes toward pornography and responses to not a love story—A film about pornography

Men and women viewing the anti-pornography documentary Not a Love Story were surveyed about their opinions and attitudes toward pornography and toward the film. Women were found to be significantly more negative toward pornography than men, and experienced greater attitude and belief changes from the film. In addition, men's and women's attitudes toward pornography were found to differ in their factor structure; the authors infer that acceptance or rejection of pornography has different significance for men and women. Background variables such as current marriage, sex of children, and amount of pornography previously seen affected men's attitudes more than women's. The authors conclude that gender-free, ‘humanist’ standards according to which pornography could be evaluated do not exist, and that approaches to pornography control based on its role in the particular oppression of women are valid.