Comparing Circuits: Are Some U.S. Courts of Appeals More Liberal or Conservative Than Others?

This article investigates possible ideological differences between circuits of the U.S. Courts of Appeals. It looks at the distribution of three‐judge panel ideologies on the circuits and at differences in decisionmaking patterns, testing several theoretical approaches to circuit differences: the attitudinalist approach, arguing that different judicial ideologies account for intercircuit differences; historical‐institutionalist approaches that argue that circuit norms lead to differences in the proportion of conservative decisions and in the effects of judicial ideologies; and the rational‐choice institutionalist argument that overall circuit preferences constrain three‐judge panel decisions through the en banc process. Using a multilevel logit model, the study finds some support for the attitudinalist and historical‐institutionalist accounts of circuit differences. It also finds that intercircuit ideological differences contribute comparatively little to the prediction of appeals court outcomes.     

Uncovering patterns of public perceptions towards biodiversity crime using conservation culturomics

Crime, Law and Social Change - To launder money is, by definition, to obfuscate and to hide, which makes it a notoriously difficult topic to study. Data access is another challenge contributing to...     

Can the management school explain noncompliance with international environmental agreements?

Although the management school has been highly influential in the international cooperation literature, the explanatory power of Chayes and Chayes’ three explanations of noncompliance with international environmental treaties remain understudied. Having developed a framework for examining the explanatory power of treaty ambiguity, lack of state capacity, and unexpected social or economic developments, this paper conducts a rigorous empirical test in the context of a well-suited case—the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol. A careful reading shows that the language of the protocol is clear and unambiguous; indeed, there has been no disagreement over the treaty’s content. Furthermore, statistical analyses show no positive effect of political capacity on compliance. Finally, parties had adequate time to meet their obligations, and unexpected developments explain only a small part of the observed noncompliance. These findings pose a serious challenge to Chayes and Chayes’ three explanations of noncompliance—at least as far as the Gothenburg Protocol is concerned.     

Limited Liability and Imperfect Information—On the Existence of Safety Equilibria Under Products Liability Law

In the literature on the economics of tort law the Cournot-Nash equilibrium concept has been undisputed. In particular, the existence of a Cournot-Nash safety equilibrium has been taken for granted, given the usual convexity assumptions. In this paper a simple model of strict liability with the defence of contributory negligence is considered. Liability is assumed to be limited. It is shown that for a certain range of liability limits no Cournot-Nash safety equilibrium in pure strategies exists. A mixed strategy equilibrium exists but it turns out to be suboptimal.