A Neoconservative Consensus in Russia?

This article analyzes the ideational consensus that has taken shape in contemporary Russian politics, including its key components, and factors both of stability and of potential erosion. Noting the extraordinary durability of this consensus, which is supported by factors including the duration of the regime itself, its support among elites and the bureaucracy, effective mobilizational propaganda and conservative orientations among the middle classes and dominant public opinion, the author draws attention to several factors – as yet less evident – that may in the future change the situation. Among these are the volatility of public opinion, potential intra-elite dynamics, and the internal contradictions of the neo-conservative idea itself.     

STR data for the 15 AmpFlSTR identifiler loci in the Western Romanian population

Allele frequencies for the 15 tetranucleotide short tandem repeat loci contained in the AmpFlSTR Identifiler kit were obtained from a population sample of 219 unrelated individuals born in the western part of Romania.     

The urban household in Russia and the Soviet Union, 1900–2000: Patterns of family formation in a turbulent century

Starting from census data on co-residence and household composition, the authors analyse principles of family organisation and family formation in twentieth-century urban Russia and the Soviet Union. The article uses an adapted version of the classification of households developed by Peter Laslett and Eugene Hammel to study variation in household structure for successive population censuses. Changes in this variation between cross-sections are explained with the help of additional quantitative and qualitative data and are linked to the fundamental demographic, social and economic shifts which took place in Russian society in the course of the twentieth century. The article finds a family system characterised by a tendency towards nuclear family formation, but incorporating a fairly stable element of household extension. Co-residence of three generations was both an answer to a perennial housing problem and offered important advantages in the sphere of childcare and care for the elderly. Variation and fluctuation in household structure are found to be most pronounced during the turbulent first half of the century. After a period of stability during the post-war decades of Soviet rule, post-Soviet transformations provoke new changes.     

Whither Equality? Securing the Lay Citizens' Place Inside the Criminal Justice System

This paper argues that lay jurors should be given a more extensive position in making decisions about misdemeanour cases. The paper constitutes a qualified defense of the 2011 judicial French reform. This reform associates two extra jurors to the already existing three magistrates in charge of misdemeanour cases. Two arguments are presented in favour of this measure. The first argument is that increasing the number of decision‐makers improves the accuracy of verdicts. I call this the argument from quantity. The second argument is that fostering more identity diversity between decision‐makers tends to improve the quality of group decisions. I call this the argument from diversity. The argument from quantity and the argument from diversity are supported by the more general idea that one of the chief rationales of any judicial system is that of ensuring the defendants' equality of protection.     

The Russia-NATO mistrust: Ethnophobia and the double expansion to contain “the Russian Bear”

This paper argues that Russian-Western mistrust persists due to historical and cultural developments with roots in the Cold War. The post-Cold War imbalance of power served to exacerbate the problem. The United States emerged as the world's superpower acting on perceived fears of Russia, whereas Russia's undermined capabilities dictated a defensive, rather than a hegemonic response. The paper analyzes the decision to expand NATO by excluding Russia from the process. It also asks why the process suddenly stopped in 2008. What changed the West's mind about the expansion was not a revised perception of Russia, but rather concern with its growing power and assertiveness as revealed by the Kremlin's use of force during the Caucasus' war.     

If not by tanks,then by banks? The role of soft power in Putin's foreign policy

This article considers the benefits of the recently developed concept of ‘soft power’ in understanding Russia's foreign policy. It argues that claims that Moscow is exercising a form of soft power imperialism in the former Soviet region cannot be fully supported by the existing evidence. To differentiate between the imperialist and stabilising objectives of Russian foreign policy the article analyses the Russian domestic discourse on exploiting soft power in foreign policy. It then compares the views of different schools of thought with Vladimir Putin's philosophy and foreign policy record. Finally, it selects for closer investigation Russia's policy in the Caucasus.     

Projecting Confidence, Not Fear: Russia's Post-Imperial Assertiveness

Contrary to the increasingly popular image of Russia as an aggressive, imperialist state, the primary drivers in Russia's foreign policy are domestic. They include new economic confidence, new soft power, and remaining security vulnerabilities. In response to these conditions, Russia pursues opportunities for economic growth and stability, and it builds strategic alliances in the near and distant abroad in order to address increasing security threats. The often-used comparison of Russia's foreign policy assertiveness to the Soviet Cold War policy is inaccurate. A better parallel is to Russia's 1890s policy led by Finance Minister Sergei Witte: strong internal economic development through state-driven liberalization, while avoiding foreign policy adventures. The United States should follow a policy of pragmatic substantive engagement, rather than neo-containment, toward Russia.     

New Challenges for Putin's Foreign Policy

This article evaluates Russia's foreign policy after Vladimir Putin's reelection as president in March 2004. New challenges, such as the intensification of terrorist activities in the Northern Caucasus, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the destabilization of Central Asia, and the refusal by some European states to attend the celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of victory over fascism hosted in Moscow became important tests of Putin's strategy of great-power pragmatism. That strategy reflected a desire for Russia to be a normal great power and focused on cooperating with Western nations on a range of economic and security issues. This course had to be defended against criticisms at home in the context of intensified efforts by Western nations, particularly the United States, to influence developments in the former Soviet states. The article concludes by reflecting on some dilemmas that Putin's strategy is likely to encounter in the future.