Spheres of liberty,conflict and power: The public lives of private persons

State‐society relations during the modern period reflect notions of citizenship analogous to Isaiah Berlin's concepts of positive and negative liberty. Positive citizenship, motivated by what Robert O'Brien calls ‘the democratic impulse’, is highly participatory. The politics of seventeenth‐century Protestant social movements constitutes one historical model to which twentieth‐century fundamentalist movements can be compared. Characterized by a shrinkage of the private sphere and an expansion of public life, positive citizenship emphasizes active engagement in establishing and implementing normative standards for individuals and communities, and control of the state for virtuous ends. Negative citizenship concentrates on the protection of individual rights, expanding both the private sphere and a third or meta‐space which evinces qualities of public and private realms simultaneously. The historical model presented is what Jürgen Habermas has called the ‘bourgeois public sphere’, a quasi‐parallel polis from within which critics of state power assert their right to resist and organize their capacity to repel attempts to enforce standards of public virtue however arrived at. These ideal types are compared to different scenarios of state‐society relations to analyze the likely impact on public and private life of rapid globalization.     

Touching stones to cross the river: Evolving telecommunication policy priorities in contemporary China

This article, drawing on fieldwork in China, charts the ascendancy of Lian Tong (China Unicom), the first competitor to the incumbent Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. Commencing with an historical overview of Chinese telecommunications, it suggests that Lian Tong's formation has been contingent upon support from key constituencies within China's political elite. The company's emergence mirrors technological trends and user pressure evident globally. It embodies the drive towards market liberalisation now evident within the Peoples’ Republic. While the Chinese policy community is sensible of the need to make haste slowly toward the goal of telecommunications competition — ‘touching stones to cross the river’ in the contemporary aphorism — the success of this ‘policy experiment’ depends both on the subtleties of Chinese politics and the construction of bold new regulatory frameworks. Lian Tong's genesis is symbolic of developments in the telecommunications sector, and maybe also more generally in the Chinese economy.     

A latent variable model of the Family-of-Origin Scale for adolescents

The Family-of-Origin Scale (FOS) is a recently developed 40-item instrument originally designed to assess adults' perceptions of the family in which they were raised. A modified version of the FOS has shown promise for assessing adolescents' perceptions of the extent to which their family fosters autonomy and intimacy. The current study involved administration of the FOS to a large sample of adolescents currently residing with their family of origin. Confirmatory factor analysis supports the scale's original 13 theoretical constructs and establishes factorial validity. Follow-up hierarchical tests indicate the current confirmatory model provides a significant refinement over other plausible models proposed by several different authors finding a similar unitary factor employing exploratory factor analyses.     

Corporate autonomy and institutional control: The crown corporation as a problem in organization design

Abstract: A central issue in the government-crown corporation decision-making relationship is the balance between corporate autonomy and institutional control. This study investigates the effects of organization designs on the balancing of autonomy and control in practice, taking account of the incentives and strategic behaviour of the relevant actors. Politicians, for example, seek to maximize their own political support, crown corporation executives their own autonomy, and bureaucratic officials within central agencies their own policy influence. Three positive approximations of normative models of organization design models are investigated in Alberta, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan. Each design establishes different “rules of the game” and offers different advantages. Alberta practice most closely approximates a “self-contained” design in which corporate actors have the information advantage and are most closely able to achieve their own objective. In Manitoba, where practice most closely approximated a “vertical information systems” design, central bureaucratic monitoring agents had the information advantage and were most closely able to achieve their own objective. Saskatchewan practice most closely approximates a “lateral relations” design. Neither corporate nor bureaucratic actors have an enduring information advantage or are more able than the other to achieve their own objective. The relative “efficiency” of these crown corporation organization designs is not known. But they do yield qualitatively different balancing outcomes. Determinations can be made, quite simply, in terms of who is “winning” the crown corporation “game.” Sommaire: L'un des aspects fondamentaux à considérer dans les rapports décisionnels entre les sociétés de la Couronne et le gouvernement est l'équilibre qui existe entre l'autonomie des sociétés et le contrble institutionnel. Plutôt que de spéculer sur le caractère optimal des divers modes organisationnels qui peuvent théoriquement servir à structurer de tels rapports, cette étude considkre leurs effets sur l'equilibre autonomie-contrble, d'un point de vue pratique, en tenant compte des comportements stratégiques et des incitations des différents intervenants. Ainsi, les politiciens cherchent à maximiser l'appui politique dont ils jouissent; les dirigeants des sociétés de la Couronne, eux, cherchent à défendre leur autonomie; de leur côte, les fonctionnaires des organismes cen-traux souhaitent protéger leur influence sur les politiques. Les auteurs se penchent sur trois modèles normatifs de concepts organisationnels en Alberta, au Manitoba et en Saskatchewan. Chaque modèle établit des «règles du jew» différentes et offre des avantages particuliers, en termes de ressources stratégiques d'in-formation pour les trois groupes d'intervenants. La répartition des avantages en matière d'information régit les comportements d'optimisation des intervenants, les amenant à différents résultats en termes d'équilibre entre I'autonomie des sociétés et le contrôle institutionnel. La pratique en Alberta s'apparente plus à un modêle d'autonomie où les intervenants des sociétés de la Couronne ont I'avantage sur le plan de l'information, ce qui leur permet de mieux parvenir à leurs propres objectifs. L'autonomie des sociétés I'emporte alors sur le contrôle des institutions. Au Manitoba, où la pratique se rapproche d'un modèle d'information médicale, les agents de surveillance des organismes centraux ont I'avantage et sont donc en mesure de mieux parvenir à leurs propres objectifs. Le contrôle des institutions I'emporte alors sur l'autonomie des sociétés de la Couronne. En Saskatchewan, le modèle s'approche de celui des «relations latérdes». Ni les intervenants des sociétés, ni les bureaucrates n'ont un avantage durable sur le plan de I'information de sorte que ni les uns ni les autres ne sont donc en mesure de mieux atteindre leurs propres objectifs. I1 en résulte éventuellement un équilibre entre l'autonomie des sociétés de la Couronne et le contrôle des institutions. L'on ignore I'eficacité relative de ces différents modèles organisationnels, mais I'on sait qu'ils ont pour résultat un équilibre différent. L'on peut donc, fort simplement, déterminer qui «gagne» au «jeu» des sociétés de la Couronne.