Learning about Voter Rationality

An important empirical literature evaluates whether voters are rational by examining how electoral outcomes respond to events outside the control of politicians, such as natural disasters or economic shocks. The argument is that rational voters should not base electoral decisions on such events, so evidence that these events affect electoral outcomes is evidence of voter irrationality. We show that such events can affect electoral outcomes, even if voters are rational and have instrumental preferences. The reason is that these events change voters' opportunities to learn new information about incumbents. Thus, identifying voter (ir)rationality requires more than just identifying the impact of exogenous shocks on electoral fortunes. Our analysis highlights systematic ways in which electoral fortunes are expected to change in response to events outside incumbents' control. Such results can inform empirical work attempting to identify voter (ir)rationality.     

Disgust,Anxiety, and Political Learning in the Face of Threat

Emotions feature prominently in political rhetoric and media frames, and they have potent effects on how people process information. Yet, existing research has largely overlooked the influence of disgust, which is a basic emotion that leads people to avoid contamination threats. We illustrate how disgust may impede learning, as compared to the more commonly studied emotion of anxiety. Disgust and anxiety are natural reactions to many kinds of political threats, but the two emotions influence political engagement in different ways. This study investigated the distinctive effects of disgust in a series of experiments that manipulated information about the outbreak of an infectious disease. People who felt disgusted by a health threat were less likely to learn crucial facts about the threat and less likely to seek additional information. Thus, disgust has the counterintuitive effect of decreasing public engagement in precisely those situations where it is most critical.     

Making Washington Work: Legislative Entrepreneurship and the Personal Vote from the Gilded Age to the Great Depression

Studies of bill sponsorship in the modern Congress highlight the effects of constituency characteristics, seniority, and committee membership. These studies, however, are limited in their ability to assess the effects of institutions. We provide the first systematic study of bill sponsorship in the premodern House of Representatives. In doing so, we take advantage of this period's expansive legislative agenda and variation in electoral system rules. Using matching and event count models, we estimate the effects of institutions, electoral competition, and members’ institutional positions and political experiences on their sponsorship of different types of bills. We find that two reforms—the Australian ballot and nominating primary—increased sponsorship of bills designed to cultivate personal votes, thereby contributing to the growth in private legislation and bills aimed at local constituencies. Our results establish these reforms as a major event shaping lawmaking activity and, with it, the character of contemporary representation.     

Policy Attitudes in Institutional Context: Rules,Uncertainty, and the Mass Politics of Public Investment

This article examines the link between citizens’ policy attitudes and the institutional context in which policies are carried out. The article develops a theory of opinion formation toward policies that impose costs on citizens in order to invest in broadly valued social goods. In this framework, problems of agency loss and time inconsistency leave citizens uncertain about whether promised policy benefits will be delivered. Citizen support for public investments thus depends on whether the institutional context makes elites’ policy promises credible. We consider hypotheses about how the institutional allocation of authority and the institutional rules governing implementation affect citizen support for public investment, and we find broad support for the framework in three survey experiments administered to representative samples of U.S. citizens. The results shed light on the link between political institutions and citizens’ attitudes, the capacities of voters for substantive political reasoning, and the political prospects for public investment.     

Public affairs practice and lobbying inequality: Reform and regulation of the influence game

Although vigorous lobbying by groups within society is essential for the functioning of democracy, it is widely perceived that resource‐rich groups, particularly corporations, enjoy unfair advantages and influence. This perception damages public trust in the efficacy of civic participation and the legitimacy of policymaking. This problem intermittently leads reformers and scholars to assess and develop policies that might assist in addressing lobbying power imbalances. This paper takes up Moloney's call for exploring ways of intervening in the communicative economy to directly address the problem of lobbying inequality. It considers the extent of lobbying inequalities and theoretical frameworks for understanding how resources enable an influence advantage, before assessing the types of regulatory approaches that have been used by democratic institutions. Voluntary measures that could be taken by the corporate sector and professional associations are considered, alongside the current interest in using digital platforms to identify inequalities and incorporate public preferences as a variable in allocating lobbying resources.     

Joined‐Up for What? Response to Carey and Harris on Adaptive Collaboration

Carey and Harris present the concept of adaptive management as a practice for supporting effective collaboration, suggesting that performance information be used to modify actions. They observe that end‐outcome performance information is less useful because of long delays between actions and effects, and recommend instead that the performance information should concern the collaborative process itself. The New Zealand government has followed a similar path to the Australian journey described by Carey and Harris. First, New Zealand tried using end outcomes to drive collaboration. Then, New Zealand tried using process measures, but found that the resulting collaboration lacked purpose and urgency. More recently, New Zealand has found great success in using intermediate‐outcome measures to drive adaptive collaboration: measures with intrinsic value, but short delay between action and effect. We echo Carey and Harris’ call for adaptive collaboration, but write to suggest that intermediate outcomes, rather than process measures, may drive more purposive management.