Property Rights and Forest Commons

Although property rights have been linked to a variety of positive social outcomes at the macro‐level, less research focuses on how property rights affect the benefits that actors receive at the micro‐level. This article examines property rights to a common‐pool resource (CPR) that are asymmetrically allocated among users, and presents a theoretical argument that property rights affect the allocation of resource benefits in two important ways. First, users with extensive property rights receive more benefits than users with limited property rights. Second, users with the power to influence how community rules are enforced—for example, landholders and ethnic majorities—more effectively define and defend their property and thus receive disproportionate CPR benefits compared to users with similar levels of property rights, but with less power. Using household‐level survey data in Bolivia, Kenya, Mexico, and Uganda, collected after a period of property rights decentralization, the empirical analysis finds support for these propositions. We conclude that power critically moderates the effects of property rights on the commons.     

Administration in a small capitalist state: The Hong Kong experience

This article is primarily concerned with the functions of bureaucracy in a minimal state and with how those functions might change in response to economic growth. It is predicated on the assumption that bureaucracy is necessary for economic growth even in those countries which seek to achieve such growth through the relatively free operation of the economy within the rubric of a capitalist state. Hong Kong is a case in point. Although it has often been taken as the epitome of the benefits which can be derived from keeping government out of the economy, the bureaucracy has in fact played a critical role in support of economic development. Aside from the functions which must be performed by any state, such as the maintenance of law and order, the administration of justice, and the provision of public works, three features of Hong Kong bureaucratic practice appear to have been important in the definition of the bureaucracy's tasks in the economic growth process. These are ‘value for money’ and the constant need to justify government expenditure; effective line implementation; and the ability to manage crises. If these constitute minimal essential requirements for such governments, they may provide useful criteria which small or micro-states, following capital growth models but not yet experiencing rapid economic development, can apply in assessing the capabilities of their own bureaucracies.