La représentation politique dans les doctrines et dans les institutions au XVIIIème et au XIXème siècles en Europe et aux Etats‐Unis: Une recherche en cours

SUMMARY

In this article Cristiana Senigaglia seeks to elucidate Hegel's conception of the coup d'état. This is necessary because Hegel did not systematically expound his view in this writings, notably it is not treated in his central work, Die Philosophie des Rechts. But a consistent view can be found in his historical and philosophical writings. The article suggests that Hegel did consider there were circumstances in which a use of force to change an existing political order, or lack of it, were justified. He cited the political chaos in early modern Italy, or the constitutional instabilities in France in his own time as examples where the forces of history justified illegal and forceful interventions, be they from above or below, or the intervention of the decisive historical individual, a Caesar or a Bonaparte. To be justified, in Hegel's view, such irregular actions must be consistent with the contemporary underlying forces driving the historical process: they must have the effect of creating a new, acceptable legal order to replace that which is overthrown; and in consequence must result in a new normalization. In order to be justified, and thus to succeed in the long term, the exceptional situation created by the coup must be temporary and limited. Hegel saw Robespierre and Bonaparte as examples where a justified coup was initiated, but then the will of the initiators became an obstacle to a new normalization.     

The paradox of the region: economic regulation and the representation of interests

This article deals with the relationship between economic regulation and interes-group representation at the regional level in advanced capitalist societies. The importance of an ‘intermediate government’ of economic development at the regional level has increased in recent years within such societies as a result of the crisis of the Keynesian wlfare state and the decline of Fordism. At the same time, however, the growing need for regional regulation does not necessarily call into being an explicit demand for and supply of efficient regional government within the existing institutional framework. This ‘paradox fo the region’ is explored int he context of the Italian case, characterized by strong local but weak regional identities organizations of business and labour for an effective intermediate government of the economy, an proposes a strategy for reinforcing such organizatons at this level through the reform of regional government administration and the supervised delegation of public powers to them.     

Emission Trading Restrictions with Endogenous Technological Change

In this paper we use a simple climate model for endogenous environmental technical change in order to analyse the effects on equity and efficiency of placing different degrees of restrictions on trade in the market of pollution permits. The model is obtained by incorporating in Nordhaus and Yang (1996)'s RICE model a notion of induced technical change close to the one proposed in Goulder and Mathai (2000). With the help of such a model, we assess the pros and cons of introducing ceilings on emission trading. In particular, we analyse both the cost effectiveness and the distributional effects of placing restrictions of trading emissions. The analysis takes into account the role of environmental technical change that could be enhanced by emission trade limitations. However, this effect is shown to be offset by the increased abatement cost induced by the larger than optimal adoption of domestic policy measures when ceilings are made binding. Hence, our analysis provides little support for quantitative restrictions of emission trading, even when these restrictions actually have a positive impact of technical change. Even in terms of equity, ceilings find no justification within our theoretical and modelling framework. Indeed, we find that flexibility mechanisms in the presence of endogenous technical change increase equity and that the highest equity levels are achieved without ceilings, both in the short and in the long run.     

Informal payments for health care: definitions, distinctions, and dilemmas

There is increasing interest in the issue of informal payments for health care in low- and middle-income countries. Emerging evidence suggests that the phenomenon is both diverse, including many variants from cash payments to in-kind contributions and from gift giving to informal charging, and widespread, reported from countries in at least three continents. However, cross-national research is hampered by the lack of consensus among researchers on the definition of informal payments, and the definitions that have been proposed are unable to incorporate all forms of the phenomenon that have been described so far. This article aims to overcome this limitation by proposing a new definition based on the concept of entitlement for services. First, the various forms of informal payment observed in practice are reviewed briefly. Then, some of the proposed definitions are discussed, pointing out that none of the distinctive characteristics implied by these definitions, including illegality, informality, and corruption, is adequate to capture all varieties of the phenomenon. Next, an alternative definition is formulated, which identifies the distinctive feature common to all forms of informal payments as something that is contributed in addition to the terms of entitlement. Then, the boundaries implied by this definition are explored and, finally, the implications for research and policy making are discussed with reference to the lessons developed countries can learn from the experiences of transitional countries.