The Global Era of National Policy and the Pan-Oceanic National Fleet

This article develops a framework for considering the future requirements for U.S. maritime power. It does so by proposing that these requirements must be considered within the context of an integrated National Fleet—the combined capabilities of the three “Sea Services”—the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard. It also would include their reserve components, as well as the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and the Maritime Administration's Ready Reserve Force (RRF)—the two organizations responsible for maintaining the nation's strategic sealift fleet.     

Self-Objectification,System Justifying Beliefs,and the Rise of Labiaplasty

Social Justice Research - Labiaplasty, an invasive surgical procedure that reduces the size of the labia minora, has dramatically increased in popularity, particularly among adolescent and young...     

The Rise of Gulf War Paradigm 2.0

The adage that “it is always easier to fight the last war” is one that readily can be applied to the United States and its armed forces for not predicting the scale and type of operations encountered in the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. This article argues that the lack of preparation in the post-invasion phases arose from an institutional attachment to a preferred paradigm of warfare, as exemplified by the Persian Gulf War of 1991. This paradigm, though, has been substantially resurrected and re-configured to suit the fighting preferences of the American armed forces in its protracted encounters in Iraq and Afghanistan. Far from re-orienting its organization and mindset to meet the challenges of so-called counterinsurgency campaigns, as much current advocacy maintains, the military has reverted to the form of warfare it knows best.     

Cycles of Jihadist Movements and the Role of Irrationality

The article argues that Islamist terror is driven by irrational forces; it analyzes jihadist values and doctrines that animate Islamic revolutionaries; it then contends that jihadist movements go through a cycle of mobilization, extremism, implosion and recreation. Finally, it assesses the prospects for jihadist revitalization, extremism, and decline in Syria and the Sahel. Examples from the Iraqi and Algerian jihadist campaigns are used for illustrative purposes throughout.     

Iranian Involvement in Yemen

For at least a decade, there have been numerous Yemeni, Saudi, and other countries’ assertions that Iran has been involved in supporting northern Yemeni rebels seeking autonomy from the Sana’a government. Iranian diplomatic and political support for this rebellious group (known as the Houthis) is undeniable, but Iranian military assistance for them has not always been easy to prove. This situation appeared to change in 2011 when Iran's increased involvement in Yemen occurred in response to both the chaotic situation there during the final year of the Saleh regime and the danger that the Arab Spring revolutions would leave Iran increasingly isolated. Evidence of Iranian efforts to supply weapons to the Houthis now seems overwhelming in contrast to uncertain reports prior to 2011. In addition, at least some of Yemen's southern secessionists also appear to be receiving at least limited Iranian financial support.