Delaying Justice(s): A Duration Analysis of Supreme Court Confirmations

Presidents traditionally have had great success when nominating justices to the Supreme Court, with confirmation being the norm and rejection being the rare exception. While the confirmation process usually ends with the nominee taking a seat on the Court, however, there is a great deal of variance in the amount of time it takes the Senate to act. To derive a theoretical explanation of this underlying dynamic in the confirmation process, we draw on a spatial model of presidential nominations to the Court. We then employ a hazard model to test this explanation, using data on all Supreme Court nominations and confirmations since the end of the Civil War. Our primary finding is that the duration of the confirmation process increases as the ideological distance between the president and the Senate increases. We also find evidence that suggests that the duration increases for critical nominees and chief justices and decreases for older nominees, current and previous senators, and nominees with prior experience on state and federal district courts .     

Do school accountability systems make it more difficult for low‐performing schools to attract and retain high‐quality teachers?

Administrative data from North Carolina are used to explore the extent to which that state's relatively sophisticated school‐based accountability system has exacerbated the challenges that schools serving low‐performing students face in retaining and attracting high‐quality teachers. Most clear are the adverse effects on retention rates, and hence on teacher turnover, in such schools. Less clear is the extent to which that higher turnover has translated into a decline in the average qualifications of the teachers in the low‐performing schools. Other states with more primitive accountability systems can expect even greater adverse effects on teacher turnover in low‐performing schools. © 2004 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Bolt from the Blue or Avoidable Failure? Revisiting September 11 and the Origins of Strategic Surprise

Drawing on the strategic surprise, warning-response, and foreign policy literature, this article argues that the September 11 terror attacks should be regarded as a strategic surprise and examines a number of key factors that contributed to vulnerability and inhibited vigilance. Three broad explanatory "cuts" derived from the literature—psychological, bureau-organizational, and agenda-political—are deployed to sift through the rapidly expanding empirical record in an effort to shed light on the processes and contextual factors that left the United States vulnerable to the attacks. The article aims to improve our understanding of generic processes and practices that enhance or detract from vulnerability and vigilance.     

Implementing the artist's resale right directive

Legal context: Directive 2001/84/EC, on the resale right for the benefit ofthe author of an original work of art, introduced the harmonisationof artist's resale right within the EU (and subsequently withinthe EEA). Resale right already existed in many EU States, butthe Directive also required its creation in others (such asthe UK) to which it was previously unknown. The implementationof the Directive in the UK was accordingly a matter of somecontroversy. Key points: This article concentrates on the legal difficulties involvedin that implementation, viewed against the background of theUK Government's stated general policy on the transposition ofEU Directives. From several points of view, the rules laid downin the Directive called for elaboration or clarification, andin a number of cases such an approach was appropriate. In othercases, however, this turned out not to be appropriate. Practical significance: As a result, although in the main it was possible to transposethe Directive into a clear and workable set of domestic rules,a number of issues had to remain unresolved. Among the mostimportant were: whether works of ‘applied art’ shouldattract resale right, and the territorial scope of the transactionscovered by the right.