Analyzing the turnout-competition link with aggregate cross-sectional data

Numerous papers by Public Choice oriented scholars and others have sought to test the hypothesis inspired by Downs (1957) that, ceteris paribus, turnout should be higher when elections are close. Most look in cross-sectional terms at variations in turnout at the constituency level for elections of a given type. By and large the results have been disappointing (see, e.g., Foster, 1984). We are skeptical of these weak findings and argue that a complete portrait of the turnout-competition link requires us to examine that link for at least three different types of turnout (turnout among potential eligibles, turnout among registrants, and turnout for a given office relative to other offices such as top of the ticket), and to take into account longitudinal changes in turnout. For recent off-year elections to the U.S. Senate and also for off-year elections to the U.S. House of Representatives in states where there was no gubernatorial or senatorial contest on the ballot, we find strong evidence for higher turnout among eligibles in close contests. For these elections to the U.S. Senate we also find evidence for an ecological effect that leads to turnout being maximized at values of competition other than 50–50. Moreover, when we look at turnout for office relative to top of the ticket voting in the California Assembly and the U.S. Senate in presidential years, we again find some evidence for an ecological effect in which turnout is maximized at a value of Republican vote share above 50 percent and find further strong evidence for a clear link between competition and turnout for office among those at the polls.     

Inspecting the Inspectors: Overseeing Labor Inspectorates in Parliamentary Democracies

Most theories of how to control bureaucracies are derived from American experience and are tested with data from the U.S. In contrast, this article uses evidence from the 15 members of the European Union to examine oversight mechanisms through which legislators attempt to control the bureaucracy. Analysis of European data shows that "police patrol" mechanisms of oversight appear in countries with relatively little gridlock as measured by the ideological range of their governments. "Deck stacking" mechanisms appear in countries that experience greater problems with gridlock measured in the same way.     

Democracy,Government Spending,and Economic Growth: A Political-Economic Explanation of the Barro-Effect

The paper develops a political economicargument for the recently observed inverseu-shaped relation between the level ofdemocracy and economic performance. A modelis constructed that shows why and howpolitical participation influences thespending behavior of opportunisticgovernments that can choose an optimalcombination of rents and public goods toattract political support. If the level ofdemocracy remains comparably low,governments rationally choose rents as aninstrument to assure political support.With increasing democratic participation,however, rents become an increasinglyexpensive instrument while the provision ofpublic goods becomes more and moreefficient in ensuring the incumbentgovernment's survival in power. As a consequence, an increase in democracy tends toraise growth rates of per capita income.However, the beneficial impact of democracyon growth holds true only for moderatedegrees of political participation. If –in semi-democratic countries – politicalparticipation increases further,governments have an incentive toover-invest in the provision of publicgoods. This model allows to derive and testthree hypothesis: Firstly, based on asimple endogenous growth model, weempirically substantiate our hypothesis ofa non-linear, inverse u-shaped relationbetween the level of democracy and growthof per capita income. Secondly, we showthat the impact of government spending oneconomic growth is higher in moredemocratic countries. Thirdly, wedemonstrate that the level of democracy andgovernment share of GDP are correlated in au-shaped manner.     

Zur Theorie der Interessenvermittlung: Ein Netzwerkansatz dargestellt am Beispiel der Gemeinsamen Europäischen Agrarpolitik

Recent policy network studies contribute significantly to the theory of interest mediation. Despite this contribution policy network approaches still contain major theoretical deficiencies and a lack of empirical application can be observed. In this context a typology of systems of interest mediation is theoretically derived on the basis of new developments in the political exchange theory (Pappi/Henning 1998a). Analogously to the typology of economic markets, the typology corresponds to the social organization of political exchange in policy networks. Further, it is demonstrated that in contrast to conclusions found in the literature no general correspondence of specific types of interest mediation and policy-outcomes in terms of weak versus strong states, efficient versus inefficient economic policies and biased versus unbiased mediation of societies interests can be expected. In the empirical part of the paper the typology is applied to the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) using policy network data. In particular, a block model analysis is applied aggregating a set of multiple network relations among a multitude of public and private actors operating in the CAP to identify whether the overall social macro structure corresponds to national clientelism or supranational pluralism.     

Robust emergency management: The role of institutional trust in organized volunteers

In these turbulent times of increased frequency and magnitude of emergencies caused by climate change, pandemics, and other public safety hazards, there has been a growing interest in the question of how to enhance the robustness of emergency management systems. Recent research points to integrated networks of public and non-profit actors as a superior strategy for developing robust governance responses to turbulent problems. This article suggests that institutionally conditioned trust between professionals and volunteers is key to robust emergency management. Based on institutional trust theory and the findings of an empirical case study of local emergency management in Denmark and Norway, it shows how six institutional sources of trust condition the scalable use of organized emergency management volunteers. The study contributes with a theoretical argument and empirical insights on how institutional trust strengthens the robust governance and management of emergencies.     

IMF flexibility or neoliberal adaptation: A discursive content analysis of Article IV policy biases in Argentina

At the turn of the century, the consensus among scholars was that the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) policy preferences, which centered on deflation via austerity, privatization, and deregulation, were indicative of its neoliberal bias. However, a subsequent wave of literature has challenged this view by suggesting that the IMF has demonstrated flexibility. While these accounts arrive at their conclusion via different analytical and empirical focuses, this article posits that the flexibility or breath of ideas found within the discourse itself is key to gauging policy biases (previous study). Herein, this article contributes to the question of whether the IMF can be considered a “flexible” institution via its analysis on Argentina (1989–2006; 2016–2017). Extending a previous study's methods, this one provides a “discursive content analysis,” on the IMF–Argentine Article IV consultations. Ultimately, the findings show that policy discourse remained neoliberal throughout.     

High Performance Expectations: Concept and Causes

Employees contribute more when they are aware of their leaders’ high performance expectations (HPE), but how can leaders successfully convey HPE? Here it is argued that both transformational and transactional leadership behaviors involve goal-setting, which can affect employee-perceived HPE. Using a leadership training field experiment with 3,730 employees nested in 471 organizations, the findings support that training in transformational, transactional and combination leadership training significantly increased employees’ HPE relative to a control group. Furthermore, transformational leadership and pecuniary rewards seem to be important mechanisms. This implies that public leaders can affect HPE through leadership and thus potentially organizational performance.     

Climate change research in bilateral development programmes: experiences from India and Peru

This article reflects on the merits and shortfalls of bilateral research programmes aimed at strengthening climate change research capabilities, using the experience from two programmes, the PACC and IHCAP in Peru and India, respectively. The study highlights key aspects of these types of bilateral programmes, namely: capacity; performance, salary and appreciation; funding; bureaucracy and hierarchy; publishing; and data sharing. Furthermore, it emerged that these programmes would benefit from a more extensive consolidation phase of the research activities and partnership rather than rapidly transferring into out- and up-scaling phases.