Fatal intoxication by Remoxipride

The case history and toxicologic findings of a 23-year-old woman who committed suicide with Remoxipride are described. Remoxipride is a recently developed neuroleptic drug of the benzamide type. Remoxipride was detected in the liver, stomach content, blood, and urine. The concentration of Remoxipride in the blood was 230 mg/L. The recommended therapeutic level for Remoxipride should not exceed 7 to 8 mg/L. The victim had no blood alcohol, but an ethanol concentration of 0.048 g/100 L was detected in the urine. The mechanism of death from Remoxipride intoxication is not known. In clinical studies, sinus bradycardia and infrequent supraventricular and ventricular ectopic beats have been noted.     

ABO and Lewis typing of secretion stains on nitrocellulose membranes using a new dot-blot-ELISA technique

A new method for ABO and Lewis typing of body fluids is described. It combines the advantages of a good antigen binding to nitrocellulose membranes, the need of only very small amounts of stain material and the high sensitivity of an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay for antigen detection. This is of special interest because conventional ABO and Lewis typing of secretion stains need relatively large stain dimensions. The method is very easy to handle, does not need any expensive equipment and gives a permanent record. Furthermore the high sensitivity offers the possibility of analyzing even sweat and urine stains without the need of concentrating these extracts.     

Myths of the insanity defense: Inherent and procedural obstacles

Often societies perceptions can be shaped by the media not only by what it reports but by how it is reported. This article discusses the impact that the American media has had on the social perception that the insanity defense is too often successfully used to avoid legal and criminal culpability. Many of the procedural obstacles associated with the assertion of an insanity defense are poorly understood or ignored. The article further address some of the less attractive characteristics associated with the assertion of the insanity defense that are not procedurally founded but nonetheless serve as an impediment the wide spread use of the defense. In conclusion the insanity defense is submitted as an unavoidable necessary evil in a civilized society that incarcerates its criminals.     

“Purpose versus practice in the use of electronically monitored home confinement”

This paper explores differences between the stated purpose and actual practice of electronically monitored home confinement as a prison-diversion strategy. Methods and data are triangulated to examine the difference between the stated purposes of electronic monitoring and its actual usage in two contexts: 1) the decision to imprison/probate; and 2) the actual use of electronically monitored home confinement. Sentencing information, along with data on employment, family, substance abuse, prior convictions, and type of offense, were collected on 391 felony offenders sentenced to probation in 1987–89 from three counties located in two large Metropolitan Statistical Areas in Texas. Information gathered from interviews with probation officials is also employed. This paper presents an analysis of this data and discusses its implications for future use and evaluation of electronically monitored home confinement.     

How jurors construe “insanity”

Historically and currently, jurors who have rendered verdicts in insanity cases have themselves been criticized and maligned-accused of being simplistic and biased, of lacking understanding, and of disregarding or nullifying the judge's instructions. Are the critics right? In this study, 263 mock jurors (141 adults and 122 students) were asked to decide four insanity cases without instructions, using their own best judgment, and to identify the determinative facts for them, and the meaning of those facts. Those determinative factors were then categorized, using a seven construct schema for NGRI and guilty verdicts. The results show that jurors do make discriminations among cases in terms of constructs, and that these constructs are relevant, complex, and flexible; furthermore, the jurors' lay constructs of insanity are more complex than the legal constructs of insanity. The “simplism,” it seems, lies not with the jurors but with the insanity tests.