Manic-depressive illness in adolescence

The efficacy of lithium carbonate as a treatment for manic-depressive illness has stimulated a reevaluation of the syndrome. In this paper, the authors review the obstacles to timely diagnosis of manic-depressive illness in the adolescent. Three cases are presented demonstrating the usefulness of a unitary concept in which manic-depressive illness is understood and appreciated as having a physiologic basis, manifesting its effects in the total body system. The heterofore diverse and confusing psychological and behavioral symptoms of manic depressive illness in adolescents become intelligible when regarded as secondary phenomena: the psychic experience of the process as filtered through the psychological constitution of the individual adolescent.Supported in part by a grant from Mr. and Mrs. A. Frank Rothschild, Sr.Received her postgraduate training in psychiatry at P&PI.     

The life concept in female college students: An exploratory analysis

In the present study a two-part animism questionnaire was devised and administered to 200 female undergraduate students who had fairly extensive course backgrounds in science. When these students were asked to classify each of 15 objects as living or nonliving, 67% (N=134) gave evidence of apparent animistic thought. Yet when the subjects were asked to choose which of several statements reflected their own definition of living, 66% (N=132) claimed that only plants and animals are living. Scientific background did not relate to performance on either section of the questionnaire. Results indicate that although the primary orientation of many young adults toward the word living is not a biological one, most college students areable to classify stimuli according to this criterion.Received her Ph.D. in lifespan developmental psychology from West Virginia University in 1971. Primary research interest is cognitive functioning after childhood.     

Detection of deception with fMRI: Are we there yet?

A decade of spectacular progress in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) technology and systems neuroscience research has so far yielded few changes in our daily lives. The dearth of clinical applications of this prolific and academically promising research tool began raising the eyebrows of the public and the research funding agencies. This may be one of the reasons for the enthusiasm and interest paid to the growing body of literature suggesting that blood oxygenation level‐dependent (BOLD) fMRI of the brain could be sensitive to the differences between lie and truth. The word ‘differences’ is critical here since it refers to the often‐ignored core concept of BOLD fMRI: it is only sensitive to differences between two brain states. Thus, available studies report using fMRI to discriminate between lie and truth or some other comparative state rather than to positively identify deception. This nuance is an example of the extent to which applied neuroscience research does not lend itself to the type of over‐simplification that has plagued the interpretation of fMRI‐based lie detection by the popular press and the increasingly vocal academic critics. As an early contributor to the modest stream of data on fMRI‐based lie detection, I was asked by Dr Aldert Vrij to write a piece in favour of fMRI‐based lie detection, to be contrasted with a piece by Dr Sean Spence presenting an opposite point of view ( Spence, 2008 ). This seemingly straightforward task presented two hurdles: having to respond to the popular as well as scientific view of what lie detection with fMRI is and present a wholly positive view of evolving experimental data.