The publication of Australian Press Council Adjudication 1468: a failure to meet ‘due prominence’ requirements

The Australian Press Council, the print media self‐regulation body in Australia that receives and adjudicates complaints by the public, states that upheld adjudications are to be published with ‘due prominence’. The Council defines ‘due prominence’ as publishing the adjudication such that it is ‘likely to be read by those who saw the offending material’. In 2010 the Council upheld a complaint about misleading material that occurred on the front page of a newspaper. The complaint included that the misleading front page material triggered a large number of insulting letters about the person in that story which the newspaper published the following day. The newspaper published the upheld adjudication (no. 1468) on the letters page even though the primary offending material occurred on the front page. Rather than seek re‐publication in a more prominent location, the Australian Press Council accepted the newspaper's placement as satisfying their ‘due prominence’ requirement. Given the apparent inconsistency between publication of the adjudication on the letters page and the ‘likely to be read by’ definition of due prominence, we provided 100 adult newspaper readers with brief details of the upheld complaint and the definition of due prominence and asked where in the paper the adjudication should be published. Contrary to the Council's acceptance of the location of the newspaper's publication of the adjudication, the vast majority of newspaper readers (88%) responded with the front page (62%) or the first three pages (26%). This discrepancy is discussed in the context of the efficacy of self‐regulation and the ethical standards of bodies charged with ethical governance. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Balance of Power in Rural Marketing Networks: A Case Study of Snake Trading in Cambodia

Producers in small-scale rural markets often receive unfavourable prices for their goods as a result of more powerful market participants. This study uses a combination of price analysis and interview data to assess the position of snake hunters in the aquatic snake market from Tonle Sap Lake in Cambodia. Despite the hunters' dependence on intermediary traders for market access and credit, the evidence implies that they are not powerless participants. Intermediary traders operate under high competition as a result of the increasing scarcity of snakes and therefore, despite interlocked credit and snake markets, offer relatively high prices to hunters.     

Surrejoinder

Abstract

Boardman now says that my critique of mainstream quantitative studies of Chinese foreign policy is “perfectly justified,” yet he continues to argue in the same old unjustifiable manner. He continues the quest for timeless, placeless truths which all can agree to, a quest which both Marx and Weber long ago pointed out was impossible in a world of conflictful social relations where perception cannot be divorced from social perspective. The data does not gather itself, pattern itself or explain itself.     

Soviet propaganda and the neutron bomb decision

Abstract

In July 1977, newly elected President Jimmy Carter suddenly found himself confronted with a difficult neutron bomb decision. With a narrow victory in Congress, pro neutron‐bomb forces had successfully presented the President with the authority to proceed with production. Unfortunately, as the months passed, Carter failed to move swiftly with production of the neutron warheads which many NATO alliance members saw as a much needed deterrent to the Warsaw PACT'S massive armor superiority.

Confronted with mounting international and domestic opposition to the neutron weapon, Jimmy Carter, in the fall of 1977, insisted that the NATO allies officially support American production of the warheads before the United States would produce it. Spurred on by Carter's indecision and by certain NATO members’ reluctance to officially support the weapon, the Soviet Union shifted its propaganda machine into high gear in a massive effort to sway international opinion against the weapon.

During the first few months of 1978, Western Europe saw a flood of protests against this so‐called “inhumane” weapon. Domestic communist and left‐wing socialist opposition to the neutron bomb precipitated a precarious right‐left split within many Western European socialist parties. Nowhere was this split more graphically illustrated than within the ruling West German Social Democratic Party (SPD). Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and his moderate technocrats basically favored the neutron bomb, but feared crippling left‐wing SPD opposition and possible defections if West Germany complied with American demands to break with over 30 years of U.S.‐West German nuclear precedent and agree officially to American production of a nuclear weapon, the neutron bomb.

Only after much American cajoling did the allies move toward official NATO support for production. Carter had failed to understand the disastrous political implications which left‐wing opposition had created within the NATO countries and refused to let Schmidt and other leaders off the hook. And then in an amazing move, after Schmidt and the NATO allies had risked political ruin to reach an agreement to support the neutron bomb, President Carter pulled the rug from under them on April 7,1978, when he indefinitely delayed a decision on the weapon.

With this decision, Carter had set a dangerous precedent by yielding to Soviet pressure and had missed an opportunity to win the favor of skeptical NATO allies and critics who asserted he was too weak and indecisive. But above all, Carter had unnecessarily alienated and angered NATO leaders like Schmidt who risked possible political ruin by supporting the neutron bomb.     

The Effects of Continuous Application of the TASER X26 Waveform on Sus scrofa,

This study investigated and evaluated the safety margins of the continuous long duration (up to 30 min) effect of the TASER X26 waveform, using a Sus scrofa model. Long duration continuous stimulus has not been evaluated on humans or human surrogates prior to this study. Swine were used as models due to similarities with humans in their skin and cardiovascular systems. Very long duration was used to determine both exposure dose and possible adverse physiological effects of dose. The trial began with an application of 10 min, and subsequent animals received increasing exposure time up to a survived maximum duration of 30 min. At the onset of this work, it was hypothesized that there would be a time limit after which most animals would not survive consistent with increased dose response. However, this hypothesis was not supported by the experimental results. All animals (10 of 10) survived up to 3 min. Seven of the 10 animals survived up to a 10‐min exposure and 3 of 5 animals with a 30‐min target exposure survived the full exposure. Surviving animals were recovered and observed for 24 h, with no postrecovery deaths. This suggests that swine (based on physiology) will not experience a fatal event when exposed to the TASER X26 for a continuous 3 min. Conclusions regarding longer duration (10–30 min) are not as certain due to the small sample sizes at these time intervals.     

Keeping Cyprus off the agenda: British and American relations at the United Nations, 1954–58

From 1954 to 1958, the Greek government sought to raise the issue of self‐determination for Cyprus at the United Nations as a means of pressing for the union of the island with the Greek state ‐ enosis. The British government's objective was to ensure if possible that Cyprus was not debated using the legal argument that it was a domestic issue in which the UN had no rights. The British accepted, however, that other political and strategic arguments would be needed to defeat the Greeks and looked to the US government to support them in the UN forums. This article examines the positions of the British and Americans governments and shows the difficulties which the issue created for both in the UN in the period.