Incorporating Co-offending in Sentencing Models: An Analysis of Fines Imposed on Antitrust Offenders

Analyses of sentencing (and other criminal justice processes such as the decision to prosecute, plea bargaining, and contact with the police) often use the isolated individual as the unit of analysis. However, the criminal justice system often processes either offenses or court cases rather than persons. If court cases always involved one individual, this would have little impact. However, offenses involving co-offending—two or more persons acting together—comprise a substantial proportion of criminal activity (Reiss, 1980, 1986). Depending on the prevalence of co-offending, it may be very likely that two or more individuals involved in the same case will be selected as members of the same sample of criminal justice or criminological data. Unless it can be shown that both the individual-level variables of co-offenders and their error terms are mutually independent, analyses based on methods such as ordinary least-squares multiple regression would violate the underlying assumptions of such models. However, alternatives to linear models assuming either type of independence are available. Among the most useful of these are mixed models, specifically those assuming compound symmetry. This is illustrated with an analysis of fines imposed on criminally convicted antitrust offenders. These models may yield results which are substantially different than those from models which ignore co-offending. In a model of fines imposed on antitrust offenders, models which ignore co-offending generally overstate both estimates and statistical significance of offense-level variables and understate those of offender-level variables.     

The Forgotten Doctrine of Enumerated Powers

Professor Diamond's essay is an elaboration of his remarks ata Woodrow Wilson Center evening dialogue on the question "HowShould Authority, Responsibility, and Resources be AllocatedAmong the Levels of Our Federal System?" Though he appears atfirst to confine his observations to that particular two-hourdiscussion, it soon becomes clear that his interest ranges morebroadly to "much of the contemporary public discussion of federalism."His concern is that the traditional concept—indeed, theconstitutional—basis of this discussion has been severelyeroded (Ed.).     

Class, Status, and the Punishment of White-Collar Criminals

The treatment of white-collar offenders by the criminal justice system has been a central concern since the concept of white-collar crime was first introduced In general, it has been assumed that those higher up the social hierarchy have an advantage in every part of the legal process, including the punishment they receive as white-collar criminals. In a controversial study of white-collar crime sentencing in the federal district courts, Wheeler, Weisburd, and Bode contradicted this assumption when they found that those of higher status were more likely to be imprisoned and, when sentenced to prison, were likely to receive longer prison terms than comparable offenders of lower status. While they argued that results were consistent with "what those who do the sentencing often say about it," their analyses failed to control for the role of social class in the sentencing process. In this article we reanalyze the Wheeler et al sentencing data, including both measures of socioeconomic status and class position. Our findings show that class position does have an independent influence on judicial sentencing behavior. But this effect does not demand revision in the major findings reported in the earlier study.