Robert Tollison and operationalizing public choice

In this tribute to Robert Tollison, I will outline his contributions to the development of public choice. I focus on Tollison’s work on rent-seeking, the political economy of reform, and the rules level of analysis in sports economics. Throughout his career, Tollison brilliantly figured out ways to take insights from price theory and public choice theory and operationalize them using multiple methods of empirical analysis, including historical interpretation and statistical testing.     

A Different Carbon Tax: The Sustainable Green Tariff

Two heated current political arguments focus on carbon taxes and tariffs. This essay will develop an argument for linking carbon emissions with tariffs, through a tax on goods entering a country based on the method of transport and distance traveled, rather than based on the country of origin or category of the product. The result would be to encourage more sustainable local production, to reduce currently externalized costs of carbon emissions, to generate new tax revenues to fund reductions in regressive social insurance taxes, and to provide benefits for those adversely affected by carbon emissions.     

Appeal rate and caseload: evidence from civil litigation in Korea

Courts of modern democratic societies have generally implemented appeal procedures to correct potential errors in ruling. However, considering the time and effort that both litigants spend, availability of an appeal cannot be better than reaching the correct judgment in the original case. This difficulty raises the policy issue of how to reduce the rate of appeals and improve welfare of litigants. In this paper, we assert that lower caseloads allow judges to expend more time and effort on each case, contributing to lower appeal rates. Analysis of court-level data from Korea corroborates our inference.     

Governance and Regulation of the Peruvian University System: Overcoming Reform Resistance through Quality Assurance Policies

This article examines the new governance of the Peruvian university system, which evolved in response to market liberalisation and weak quality assurance mechanisms. New actors and commercial interests emerged, building their network of relationships within the political arena. With the passing of a new Universities Law in 2014, ambitious reforms were set in motion, designed to reverse the decline in the quality of higher education. This study examines these reforms, focusing on whether and how they are changing the governance and structure of the system. It also identifies some conceptual and design flaws, such as the weaknesses of the main steering body and the accreditation regime, as well as limitations on the independence of the regulatory agency.