Agency Law and Contract Formation

Various issues in the common law arise when agents make contractson behalf of principals. Should a principal be bound when hisagent makes a contract on his behalf that he would immediatelywish to disavow? The tradeoffs resemble those in tort, so theleast-cost avoider principle is useful for deciding which agreementsare binding and can unify a number of different doctrines inagency law. In particular, an efficiency explanation can befound for the undisclosed-principal rule, under which the agent'sagreement binds the principal even when the third party withwhom the contract is made is unaware that the agent is actingas an agent.     

Waste not, want not—A look at the impact of manufacturing extension centers

Manufacturing extension centers have helped small manufacturers improve performance on the shop floor and thereby reduce costs. This article presents a case study of a metal working firm that was able to increase productivity and profits by instituting measures recommended by a field agent working for the Florida Manufacturing Technology Center (FMTC). As a result of services provided, the company was able to boost manufacturing throughput and increase production efficiencies. Using a simulation model, the article explores how small changes in manufacturing performance can result in significant cost reduction. It then discusses the consequences of alternative strategies designed to enhance the value of goods sold, rather than lower the costs of production. It concludes by arguing that manufacturing extension centers should help companies become more distinctive as well as more efficient.     

Lobbying when the decisionmaker can acquire independent information

Politicians trade off the cost of acquiring and processing information against the benefit of being re-elected. Lobbyists may possess private information upon which politicians would like to rely without the effort of verification. If the politician does not try to verify, however, the lobbyist has no incentive to be truthful. This is modelled as a game in which the lobbyist lobbies to show his conviction that the electorate is on his side. In equilibrium, sometimes the politician investigates, and sometimes the information is false. The lobbyists and the electorate benefit from the possibility of lobbying when the politician would otherwise vote in ignorance, but not when he would otherwise acquire his own information. The politician benefits in either case. Lobbying is most socially useful when the politician's investigation costs are high, when he is more certain of the electorate's views, and when the issue is less important.     

La nacionalización del hogar en España

The nationalization of the domestic sphere in Spain is a topic that has been largely ignored. Recently, the interest in the study of banal nationalism and the impact of nationalism on everyday life has been on the rise, particularly for the Francoist and democratic era; however, its origins are not clear at all. An examination of developments in domestic architecture, interior decoration, and even gardening shows that the domestic sphere was nationalized during the first three decades of the twentieth century. Regionalist architecture was in vogue for villas and country-houses and furniture was increasingly modeled after local artisanal traditions. Domestic practices such as cooking, consuming, and cleaning were also increasingly connected with supposedly “national” traditions. During this period Spanish cuisine and many of its regional dishes were “invented”. The first phase of the nationalization of the domestic sphere in Spain is analyzed using a wide array of primary sources (press, manuals, speeches, etc.), thus contributing to the history of nationalism, gender studies, the history of architecture, and food studies, which by focusing on modernization processes largely disregarded this profound nationalization of the private sphere.     

Status and practices of the legal text

Translated by Isabelle Llasera from Statut et pratiques du texte juridique, in D. Bourcier and P. Mackay (eds.),Lire le droit. Langue, texte, cognition (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1992).     

Irreplaceable Legislators? Rethinking Minority Representatives in the New Century

We use state legislator ideology estimates (standardized W‐nominate values) to examine whether Latino and African American legislator ideological differences can be explained away by traditional constituency characteristics like partisanship and demographics. We find instead that both Black and Latino legislators are unique “types.” Our evidence supports the theoretical presumption that there is a minority dimension to legislative voting and that it is uniquely personified by minority officeholders. White, Black, Latino, Democrat, and Republican representatives are all examined for responsiveness to different partisan and racial/ethnic populations. The dataset includes all 50 state legislatures from the 1999–2000 legislative sessions, including information from the U.S. Census, NALEO, the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, Gerald Wright's Representation in the American Legislature Project, and CQ Press's Almanac of State Legislative Elections.