Dynamic estimation of ideal points for the US Congress

Theories of candidate positioning suggest that candidates will respond dynamically to their electoral environment. Because of the difficulty of obtaining “bridge votes”, most existing approaches for estimating the ideal points of members of Congress generate static ideal points or ideal points that move linearly over time. We propose an approach for dynamic ideal point estimation using Project Vote Smart’s National Political Awareness Test to construct bridge votes. We use our dynamic estimates to measure aggregate change, to measure individual-level change, and to study the institutional and structural factors that explain the changing positions of House candidates and members of Congress. We demonstrate that while the Republican Party has been selecting increasingly extreme candidates, Democratic incumbents have become more extreme while in office. We also find that the congruence between elected members of Congress and their constituents is mostly explained by the selection as opposed to the responsiveness of the candidate. Nonetheless, we find evidence of dynamic responsiveness of incumbents in specific circumstances. We find that competitiveness, midterm elections, and sharing the president’s party affiliation are associated with greater responsiveness. Conversely, retirement is not associated with a change in responsiveness. We find no evidence of responsiveness of challengers. Finally, we find that close elections draw challengers who are more in line with the district’s ideology.     

Public debt stabilization: the relevance of policymakers’ time horizons

Policymakers are stuck in time. Political short-termism, policy myopia, policy short-sightedness, and similar words have been coined to emphasize the present-centric policy thinking. Politics tends to produce short time horizons, and as a result, policymakers often fail to use present opportunities to mitigate future harms. Focusing on fiscal and monetary strategic interactions, given different separate decision makers, our paper aims to explore the effects of policymakers’ time horizons on debt stabilization. To formalize our ideas, we use the novel concept of Nonlinear-model-predictive-control Feedback Nash Equilibrium (NFNE) and find that present-centric policy thinking and decision horizons matters under several dimensions.     

Introduction to welfare economics

We show that a transfer received by a minority of the population may be sustained by majority voting, however small the minority targeted may be, when the attribution of the transfer is seen as stochastic by voters. We build a simple model wherein voters differ in income and vote over a proportional tax whose proceeds are distributed lump-sum, and each voter has a probability of receiving the transfer that depends on his income. In progressive steps, we present intuitively appealing sufficient conditions on this probability function for the social program to be supported by majority voting. We also develop intuitive conditions for the emergence of the “paradox of redistribution”, whereby more focused targeting reduces the size of the transfer program chosen by the majority. We finally apply our framework to the French social housing program and obtain that our model is consistent with a majority of French voters supporting a positive size for that program.     

Local-level law enforcement: Muscovites and their uchastkovyy

The uchastkovyy, or beat officer, is at the front lines of Russian police work. This article investigates the general environment in which the uchastkovyy functions, using Moscow as an example. More specifically, this article examines the institutional structure within which the beat cop operates, his/her duties and resources, the quota system used to evaluate his/her performance, and the nature of the interaction between the uchastkovyy and the public. In so doing, the study disaggregates the monolith that is the Russian police, focusing on that component of the force (uchastkovyy) that interacts most directly with the citizenry. It relies on data from a survey of 1500 Muscovites and four focus group encounters organized by the author to elicit a broad range of public attitudes regarding the performance and conduct of uchastkovyy, exploring particularly what measures might be taken to enhance the level of public trust in their local beat officers.     

Trust and Reciprocity in the Aftermath of Natural Disasters

Abstract

Beyond all the material and economic losses that natural disasters produce, post-disaster environments can alter the social capital of a community by affecting social norms, attitudes, and people’s behaviour. To analyse this issue, we empirically investigate the effect that the aftermath of a disaster can have on trust and reciprocity of people within communities. We do this by comparing outcomes of trust games conducted in earthquake-affected and non-affected rural villages one year after the 2010 Chilean earthquake. Our findings show that while trust levels do not differ across cases, reciprocity is lower in earthquake-affected areas.     

How Public Officials Gain Policy Influence—Lessons from Local Government in Sweden

That public officials influence public policy is generally agreed upon, but the issue of how individual officials gain this influence is less developed in the literature. Here, the stories and experiences of 10 officials, active in local environmental governing in Sweden, are used to identify, describe, and discuss key strategies for gaining policy influence. The result shows the importance of accessing key politicians; avoiding isolation within the administration; developing long-term strategies; and being skilled in communication, networking, and generating external resources. The way these officials act and think challenges some well-established theoretical notions and adds empirical insights to the democratic dilemma of bureaucratic power.