Conditional Cash Transfers and Voting for Incumbents under Democratic Backsliding: The Case of Honduras's Bono 10,000

As democracies worldwide have reverted to competitive authoritarian regimes or full dictatorships, some autocrats have used clientelist policies to strengthen their positions of power. We contend that autocrats can weaponise conditional cash transfers (CCTs) to shore up electoral support under democratic backsliding. In this vein, we analyse the impact of Honduras's Bono 10,000, a discretionary CCT, on the electoral support for the incumbent National Party and opposition blocs between 2013 and 2017, an era marked by the erosion of democracy. Using two survey waves from the AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), we show how the CCT boosted the electoral support for the National Party as democracy unravelled. Our findings contribute to the growing literature on how autocrats rely on carrots – not just sticks – to consolidate power.     

Party Polarization and the Business Cycle in the United States

A large literature has studied the trend of greaterpolarization between Democrats and Republicans in Congress.This paper empirically examines the extent to which inflationand unemployment explain cyclical movements ofpolarization over time. An informal application of thestandard Downsian spatial competition model of partiesgenerates the following relationships, ceteris paribus: (1)inflation should be associated with policy convergence, (2)unemployment should be associated with polarization, (3) theeffect of unemployment on polarization should be larger inmagnitude than the effect of inflation on convergence, and (4)the effect of unemployment on polarization should be strongerin the House than in the Senate. We estimate the relationshipbetween vote records and business cycle conditions over the1947–1999 period using a GLS model with varying lags. Ourresults are broadly consistent with these business cyclehypotheses of polarization, though greater support is found inHouse data than in Senate data.     

Chronicle of a Survival Foretold: How Protest Behavior Against Armed Actors Influenced Violence in the Colombian Civil War, 1988–2005

This article examines the circumstances under which civilians, using protests as a mechanism, alter the strategic use of violence by armed actors (rebels and state forces). By examining the civil war in Colombia between 1988 and 2005, this study finds that combatants decrease their attacks against the population when civilians protest against the enemy. Combatants interpret such demonstrations as costly signals of loyalty. Furthermore, when insurgents are the target of the protests, insurgents increase repression against civilians as rebels get stronger. In contrast, state forces (and paramilitaries) compensate for their weakness in the area by multiplying civilian victims. Both state forces and rebels, however, are likely to decrease violence against civilians when civilians protest against both parties in contested zones. In such contexts, armed actors are likely to refrain from retaliation because any violence might drive noncombatants toward the enemy.     

Who will deregulate the deregulators?

A well-intentioned and fully informed regulator may determine that the optimal policy is to deregulate the market, yet the regulator may be constrained from doing so. In this condition, deregulatory policies originate in exogenous shocks to the regulator’s choice environment. Entrepreneurship in political and economic markets is a primary source of institutional change that promotes deregulation.     

Indicators of electoral victory

We explore the role that campaign expenditures play in determining electoral outcomes. We study a two-party contest where campaign funds can affect the preferences of voters regarding the saliency of two political issues. We show that an advantage in campaign resources, a pre-campaign partisan advantage, an advantage on every salient issue, or a combination of these indicators, do not always guarantee electoral victory. By contrast, electoral victory is guaranteed if the sum of the proportions of the electorate supporting a party on every salient issue is greater than a critical value. For that to happen it is necessary (but not sufficient) that the party has an advantage on every salient issue.     

These rules are made for spending: testing and extending the law of 1/n

What is the influence of the rules of political representation on local spending? This research tests the law of 1/n in the Portuguese local context and finds that the law fails to apply. We suggest an alternative measure—the density of representation—to assess the impact of the rules of city council representation on local public expenditures. Density of representation is defined as the number of elected officials in the city council divided by city population. We find an S-shaped relationship between the density of representation and the level of local government expenditures. The level of municipal spending initially declines with increases in the density of representation, reflecting an increase in the ability of constituents to monitor their elected representatives. At higher levels of representation density, the relationship becomes positive, suggesting that the dynamics of the budgetary commons become salient. The relationship becomes negative again for extremely high density of representation owing to increases in the transaction costs of legislative decision-making. This paper discusses the implications of our findings for the reform of local government institutions and the rules of political representation.     

An externally constrained hybrid regime: Hungary in the European Union

The paper focuses on the unique, role model characteristics of the Hungarian hybrid regime, the Hungarian political system’s new incarnation forged in the past years’ democratic backsliding process. Following the short review of the main hybrid regime literature and the key analyses putting the democratic quality of the Hungarian political system under the microscope, the paper argues that Hungary’s European Union (EU) membership, the competencies of EU institutions, and the scope of EU law have played a crucial role in the development of the system’s unique characteristics. Based on this argument, the paper qualifies Hungary as an “externally constrained hybrid regime”. However, the EU does not only fulfil system constraining functions regarding the Hungarian regime, but performs system support and system legitimation functions as well. Ultimately, the changing scope of these functions, determined by the European integration’s internal dynamics, influences first and foremost the Hungarian power elite’s strategic considerations about the country’s future EU membership.     

Citizen Expectations and Satisfaction in a Young Democracy: A Test of the Expectancy‐Disconfirmation Model

Citizen satisfaction with public services has been shown to depend on citizens’ expectations and their perceptions of performance. If performance exceeds expectations, satisfaction is likely; if performance falls short of expectations, dissatisfaction is likely. The existing evidence on this process covers the United States and the United Kingdom. The authors generalize the idea of expectation‐driven citizen satisfaction (the “expectancy‐disconfirmation model”) theoretically and empirically to an institutional context of limited accountability and widespread citizen distrust. Using a survey of a broad cross‐section of the general adult population in Guadalajara, Mexico, in 2014, this article finds support for the expectancy‐disconfirmation model in this very different context. The authors also test for an effect of the type of expectation using an embedded, randomized experiment but do not find evidence of a difference between normative and empirical expectations. Findings support the usefulness of the expectancy‐disconfirmation model in a wide range of contexts.