Political Learning from Rare Events: Poisson Inference, Fiscal Constraints, and the Lifetime of Bureaus

David E. Lewis Woodrow Wilson School and Department of Politics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544 e-mail: delewis{at}princeton.edu How do political actors learn about their environment when the"data" provided by political processes are characterized byrare events and highly discontinuous variation? In such learningenvironments, what can theory predict about how learning actorswill take costly actions that are difficult to reverse (e.g.,eliminating programs, approving a risky new product, revisinga security policy, firing or recalling an appointed or electedofficial)? We develop a formal model for this problem and applyit to the termination of bureaucratic agencies. The conventionalwisdom that "the older a bureau is, the less likely it is todie" (Downs 1967, Inside Bureaucracy) persists but has neverbeen properly tested. This paper offers a learning-based stochasticoptimization model of agency termination that offers two counterintuitivepredictions. First, politicians terminate agencies only afterlearning about them, so the hazard of agencies should be nonmonotonic,contradicting Downs's prediction. Second, if terminating agenciesis costly, agencies are least likely to be terminated when politiciansare fiscally constrained or when the deficit is high. We assessthe model by developing a battery of tests for the shape ofthe hazard function and estimate these and other duration modelsusing data on U.S. federal government agencies created between1946 and 1997. Results show that the hazard rate of agency terminationis strongly nonmonotonic and that agencies are less likely tobe terminated under high deficits and divided government. Forthe first 50 years of the agency duration distribution, themodal termination hazard occurs at five years after agenciesare enabled. Methodologically, our approach ties the functionalform of a hazard model tightly to theory and presents an applied"agenda" for testing the shape of an empirical hazard function.With extensions, our model and empirical framework are applicableto a range of political phenomena.     

Regulation through titling laws: A case study of occupational regulation

This case study examines a form of occupational regulation infrequently examined in academic literature – titling laws. These laws regulate who may legally use a phrase, or title, to describe their work to the public. Focusing on the interior design industry, this article demonstrates how industry leaders use titling laws as the first step in a push for full occupational licensure. In so doing, they allege a need for regulation out of concern for public health and safety, but as data in this case study indicate, there appears to be no threat to public health and safety from unregulated interior designers. Instead, designers advocate for increased regulation of their own industry, through the evolution of titling laws to full licensure, due to the benefits it affords them.     

Regulatory Errors with Endogenous Agendas

How do a regulator's decisions depend on the characteristics and strategies of its external clients? We develop a theory of approval regulation in which an uninformed regulator may veto the submission of a better‐informed firm. The firm can perform publicly observable experiments to generate product information prior to submission. We find that when experimentation is short, Type I errors (approving bad products) are more likely for products submitted by firms with lower experimentation costs (larger firms), while Type II errors (rejecting good products) should be concentrated among smaller firms. These comparative statics are reversed when experimentation is long. We perform a statistical analysis on FDA approvals of new pharmaceutical products using two different measures of Type I error. We find consistent support for the counterintuitive hypothesis that, under particular conditions, errors are decreasing in the size of the firm submitting the product.     

Correction to: Coronial Inquests,Indigenous Suicide and the Colonial Narrative

Critical Criminology -     

Changing Attitudes about the Weak: Social and Legal Conditions for Animal Protection in China

ABSTRACT

The foundation of current legal protection for animals in China is based on the principle of “rational utilization.” This utilitarian attitude supports the exploitation of animals through the legal means of resource management. However, through a process of public education and the construction of recent legislation, attitudes toward animals are rapidly changing in China. After the introduction of the concept of animal welfare in China in 1989, preliminary socioeconomic events such as early laboratory animal science, animal cruelty reports, pet ownership, engagement in international trade, and the severe acute respiratory syndrom (SARS) epidemic helped spur a trend away from a purely utilitarian attitude toward more positive associations with animals among members of the Chinese public. This phenomenon will be analyzed through the actions of non-governmental organizations, the media, academia, and international business to influence education and the development of legislation to promote animal protection practices. In addition, recent events will be used to illustrate political realities in China that impede the full promotion of animal welfare protection.     

Changing Lenses: Conflict Analysis and Mexico's “Drug War”

U.S. policy toward Mexico has been influenced by a “drug war” frame that has left little rhetorical and operational room for creative multisectoral strategies to stem the violence and address its causes. This article proposes conflict analysis, a lens for viewing conflict that brings into focus a multilevel, integrative diagnosis of the violence in Mexico and supports recent evolutions in Plan Mérida toward a more holistic peacebuilding approach.