Performance and Accountability: Budget Reform in New Zealand

Since 1984, New Zealand has made major changes in public sector management. This article describes the perceived problems with the previous New Zealand system and discusses the reforms designed to address these problems. The changes attempt to increase efficiency by: (1) separating commercial functions from other government operations; (2) strengthening lines of ministerial and executive accountability; and (3) designing budget and financial management systems to improve measurement of public sector performance. This last reform includes shifting from an input to an output-based system, changing from cash to accrual accounting, and creating different forms of appropriations for different types of government activities. While it is too early to assess whether the reforms are successful, we note potential problems.     

The provocative public sector: Domestic political protest and public sector growth in the OECD, 1965–1982

The results shown in Tables 1 through 8 above are consistent in that %GG is repeatedly shown to be significant whether making cross-national comparisons of DPP or predicting intra-national variations over time. Therefore, Hypotheses 1a and 1b are confirmed. The confirmation of Hypotheses 2a and 2b shows that, taking into account public sector size, government growth is most provocative in countries where it represents a major socio-economic change (i.e., where the public sector is small). Government growth has a neutral impact where the role of the public sector is long-established (i.e., where the public sector is large).Hypotheses 3a and 3b posited that average and annual rates of economic growth would be inversely associated with domestic protest. These hypotheses, too, were confirmed. The belief that economic growth rates would clearly provide the margin of affordability for public sector growth was not confirmed, as the coefficient of the interaction term (%GG*%GDP) was not statistically significant.     

Pressure-group influence and institutional change: Branch-banking legislation during the Great Depression

Between 1931 and 1935 the change in the state laws governing the organizational structure of banking was significant. Twenty-two states relaxed restrictions over branch banking, even though many had previously prohibited it. We apply a model of pressure-group and rent-seeking behavior to investigate the reasons underlying this remarkable shift in the institutional arrangements for regulating the structure of the banking industry. The findings indicate that the extraordinarily high rate of bank failures tipped the political balance toward the pro-branching forces in many states. However, in a number of states growth in the influence of branch and group bankers and increases in urbanization were largely responsible for the relaxation of restrictions over branch banking.