An empirical study of tissue banking in Australia: navigating regulatory and ethical challenges

Collections of tumour samples can be an invaluable resource for medical research. There are, however, numerous ethical and legal challenges associated with tumour banking. While there has been extensive discussion of these issues in the legal and ethical literature, there are few available empirical data in relation to the activities of tumour banks in Australia, their practices around ethically charged issues, and their success in implementing complex regulatory guidelines. The aim of this study was to gain more information about the activities of tumour banks in New South Wales, Australia, with a particular focus on their management of, and attitudes towards, ethical and regulatory issues. A survey of 27 tumour collection and research facilities was conducted using a 55-item questionnaire. There is significant heterogeneity of research methodologies as well as of methods for gaining consent and ensuring donor privacy, and there is general concern among the research community about ethical and regulatory issues related to tumour banking. Heterogeneity of practice and uncertainty about ethical and regulatory requirements is problematic in its potential to hinder research and its potential to generate the space for unethical practice, whether intentional or unintentional. There is a pressing need to address these issues so that tumour banks can be used in the most ethical and efficient way possible.     

Logics of interdisciplinarity

Abstract

This paper interrogates influential contemporary accounts of interdisciplinarity, in which it is portrayed as offering new ways of rendering science accountable to society and/or of forging closer relations between scientific research and innovation. The basis of the paper is an eighteen-month empirical study of three interdisciplinary fields that cross the boundaries between the natural sciences or engineering, on the one hand, and the social sciences or arts, on the other. The fields are: 1) environmental and climate change research, 2) ethnography in the IT industry and 3) art-science. In the first part of the paper, in contrast to existing accounts, we question the idea that interdisciplinarity should be understood in terms of the synthesis of two or more disciplines. We stress the forms of agonism and antagonism that often characterize relations between disciplinary and interdisciplinary research, and distinguish between three modes of interdisciplinarity. In the second part we outline three distinctive logics or rationales that guide interdisciplinary research. In addition to the logics of accountability and innovation, we identify the logic of ontology, that is, an orientation apparent in diverse interdisciplinary practices in each of our three fields towards effecting ontological transformation in the objects and relations of research. While the three logics are interdependent, they are not reducible to each other and are differently entangled in each of the fields. We point to the potential for invention in such interdisciplinary practices and, against the equation of disciplinary research with autonomy, to the possibility of forms of interdisciplinary autonomy.     

Ignorance of the Criminal Law,and Duties to Avoid it

‘Ignorance of the law is no defence,’ so we are told from an early stage in our legal studies. Or, to be more accurate, ‘ignorance of the criminal law is no defence to a criminal charge.’ That appears to be the rule in this country, apart from a couple of well‐established exceptions and another possible one. I will argue that it is a preposterous doctrine, resting on insecure foundations within the criminal law and on questionable propositions about the political obligations of individuals and of the State. In developing these arguments, I will draw attention to the differing problems of ignorance of the criminal law in three broad areas – regulatory offences, serious crime, and offences of omission – with a view to suggesting that there is a great deal more that the State needs to do if the issue of ignorance of the criminal law is to be dealt with adequately and fairly. I begin by scrutinising the relevant rule of English criminal law and the justifications offered for it. I then go on to situate the ‘ignorance‐of‐law’ doctrine in the context of the principle of legality and the rule of law, those bastions of liberal criminal law theory. Part three then explores the three broad areas of the criminal law, and parts four and five carry the debate into the political obligations of individuals and of the State in these matters.