Attachment and the Development of Depressive Symptoms in Adolescence: The Role of Regulating Positive and Negative Affect

Journal of Youth and Adolescence - Although widely accepted, attachment theory’s hypothesis that insecure attachment is associated with the development of depressive symptoms through emotion...     

The Impact of Elections on Cooperation: Evidence from a Lab‐in‐the‐Field Experiment in Uganda

Communities often rely on sanctioning to induce public goods contributions. Past studies focus on how external agencies or peer sanctioning induce cooperation. In this article, we focus instead on the role played by centralized authorities, internal to the community. Combining “lab‐in‐the‐field” experiments with observational data on 1,541 Ugandan farmers from 50 communities, we demonstrate the positive effect of internal centralized sanctioning authorities on cooperative behavior. We also show that the size of this effect depends on the political process by which authority is granted: subjects electing leaders contribute more to public goods than subjects who were assigned leaders through a lottery. To test the ecological validity of our findings, we relate farmers’ behavior in the experiment to their level of cooperation in their community organization. We show that deference to authority in the controlled setting predicts cooperative behavior in the farmers’ natural environment, in which they face a similar social dilemma.     

The State of the State: Comparing Governance in China and the United States

How do two world powers with starkly different governing systems share common accountability problems, and why? Does the cycle of administrative reform produce additional need for reforms that come full circle, eventually exacerbating problems without solution? Yongfei Zhao and B. Guy Peters of the University of Pittsburgh examine governance in the United States and China and point out that conflicts in government functions unique to each country result in strikingly similar accountability issues.     

The policy process in developed and less developed political systems

The author argues that we do not really know how different the policymaking systems of developed and developing nations are. In his view, policymaking in less developed regimes is different from that which occurs in more affluent countries. However, the differences are frequently overstated. After analyzing several problems of the policymaking process, Peters concludes that the differences are larglely those of degree rather than of fundamentally different types of policy problems and processes. He concludes that what may matter is the degree of difficulty governments encounter in policymaking, and in some ways the less developed countries may actually enjoy some real advantages. At the same time, however, they have more informational, financial and ideological barriers that impose political limitations on policy learning.