Ministerial Resignations 1945–97

This article reports on data collected on ministerial resignations and non-resignations 1945–1997. It analyses the reasons why ministers resign and patterns that emerge in terms of the types of issues that are more likely to lead to resignation, and variances between different Prime Ministers, parties and over time. It provides the first fully quantified analysis of ministerial resignations in Britain in the post-war period to enhance the impressionistic analyses which have been offered before.     

私营企业主阶层政治参与:价值、限度与规制

私营企业主阶层的政治参与对我国经济政治社会发展产生积极功效的同时,亦带来一些负面的影响.如何进一步引导该阶层的参与行为,规制该阶层政治参与的限度,成为亟待解决的现实课题.     

累犯制度再思考

修改后的我国刑法尽管规定了普通累犯制度 ,也规定了特殊累犯制度 ,但并不完善 ,建议在刑法总则中增加打击普通同质累犯的条款 ,以构建我国刑法关于累犯制度规定的三个层次 :一般累犯、普通同质累犯、特别同质累犯 ,形成完善的累犯制度体系 ,发挥刑法总则的宏观指导作用 ,达到从重打击累犯的目的。     

孙中山权力制约思想初探

孙中山先生总结了中国数千年文明史的政治智慧,深入研究了欧美国家的政治思想、制度,结合中国的国情,提出了一整套治国理念和方针,核心是主权在民与权力制约。主要内容有民主共和思想;五权分立;军政、训政、宪政思想及选举、罢免、创制、复决四大权利学说等。对后人的有益启示是：要用法律切实保障公民的经济地位;要打牢基层民主自治的坚实基础;必须摆正主人与公仆的关系;要重视国家政体的建设与改革。     

物权的经济分析

物权状态二元结构理论可挑战甚至取代所有权权能结构分析。一些长期争议和令人困惑的以权利、权力及其关系为内容的理论问题,运用物权二元结构理论＂公式＂求解,则可以发现入口和找到出口,且能定纷止争。权利的绝对性与相对性的对立统一性,是权利自由和受约束的方法及依据;收入分配改革的关键是限制、解放和扩展权力,即权力的合理配置;市场与政府职能分工,主要是明确公权力与市场权利的边界,公权力管制的领域限于动态权利的行使;国有物权的流失和浪费,主要是因为主体代表权没有限定权利边界而可以轻易地滥用公权力。     

杨虎城到底是不是共产党员

七十年来,中共中央多次对西安事变及杨虎城给予高度评价。那么,杨虎城到底有没有加入中国共产党?他究竟做了些什么,以至于当时的南京国民党政府怀疑他在陕西搞“赤化”?他申请加入中国共产党那段绝密历史的真相到底是怎样的?1922年,处于困境的杨虎城率部暂时避居陕北。对于杨虎     

对推行工资集体协商制度有关问题的思考

“推动企业建立工资集体协商制度”在我国已上升为政府层面的具体要求，全面推行工资集体协商制度已势在必行。但是，通过对这一制度在我国的实践，仍存在一些需要解决的问题。如果不引起重视，加以解决，将会影响到我国全面推行工资集体协商制度的进程。     

中美关系进入战略性相互适应的新阶段

2005年以来,中美高层互访和美国高官访华次数明显增加,表明中美关系进入一个战略性相互适应的新阶段。     

我国公安应用型反恐人才培养模式研究

反恐应用型人才培养是反恐战略体系中的重要一环。应用型反恐人才培养模式在培养目标和层次、培养规格、专业设置、课程模式、教学方法及师资队伍等方面具有独特性。公安院校应当构建具有中国公安特色的反恐应用型人才培养的基本模式。     

International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War

Ever since the first Korean war in 1950, scholars and policymakers have been predicting a second one, started by an invasion from the North. Whether seen as arising from preventive, preemptive, desperation, or simple aggressive motivations, the predominant perspective in the west sees North Korea as likely to instigate conflict. Yet for fifty years North Korea has not come close to starting a war. Why were so many scholars so consistently wrong about North Korea's intentions? Social scientists can learn as much from events that did not happen as from those that did. The case of North Korea provides a window with which to examine these theories of conflict initiation, and reveals how the assumptions underlying these theories can become mis-specified. Either scholars misunderstood the initial conditions, or they misunderstood the theory, and I show that scholars have made mistakes in both areas. Social science moves forward from clear statement of a theory, its causal logic, and its predictions. However, just as important is the rigorous assessment of a theory, especially if the predictions fail to materialize. North Korea never had the material capabilities to be a serious contender to the U.S.–ROK alliance, and it quickly fell further behind. The real question has not been whether North Korea would preempt as South Korea caught up, but instead why North Korea might fight as it fell further and further behind. The explanation for a half-century of stability and peace on the Korean peninsula is actually quite simple: deterrence works.