The role of procedural justice in the allocation of limited resources: A West German perspective

Following the experimental design used by Barrett-Howard and Tyler (1986), this study examines the importance given by West German university students to procedural and distributive justice allocation decision making. After reading one of eight scenarios in which there was a limited resource to be allocated, the subjects answered questions concerning the importance and meaning of justice. For the most part, the results correspond to previous U.S. findings of the importance of procedural justice and its definition across various allocation settings. However, the West German students placed greater importance on having mechanisms for correcting inadequate decisions than did their American counterparts. Beyond the design of the initial U.S. study, however, the West German students were asked in an open-ended format to discuss their concerns in making the allocation decision. Nearly half of the unprompted responses centered around justice issues.     

East Germany as a unique case of societal transformation: Main characteristics and emergent misconceptions

This article examines the process of economic transformation in the new German Länder, addressing some of the misconceptions which surround it. First, it questions the concept of ‘shock therapy’. In contrast to other post‐communist countries, east Germans were cushioned from the full force of the transformation to a market economy by government policy which opted for gradualist rather than radical measures. Second, it is argued that the prejudicial effects of the ‘colonisation paradigm’ have been greatly exaggerated. Although key decision centres in political parties and organised interests were located in the west, the new Länder derived considerable benefit from the institutional transfer of a functioning system of interest representation. How then do we explain negative perceptions of economic change in the east? It is argued that these are the result of a failure to prepare the east German people for the difficulties ahead. By postponing problems and prolonging economic hardship, the gradualist road to transformation is inevitably accompanied by a deepening sense of dissatisfaction and resentment at the slow pace of economic take‐off.     

Mission Accomplished: The Wartime Election of 2004

The war in Iraq, so the widely accepted view, hurt the reelection of George W. Bush. We contend, to the contrary, that the war helped him get reelected. First, we show that his victory fits the dominant pattern of wartime elections in American history. Second, we find that Bush’s approval ratings benefited from a complex rally where the Iraq war prolonged rather than diminished the 9/11 effect; most Americans affirmed rather than disputed a link between the war in Iraq and the war on terror. Third, while Bush’s approval proves sensitive to U.S. casualties in the Iraq war, any damage to his standing prior to the election was mitigated by sufficient popular support for that war. And finally, on Election Day, Bush was able to garner the vote of two critical blocks with favorable feelings about the Iraq war, be it the decision to invade or the prospect of success.

Die Vergemeinschaftung des Kollisionsrechts der außervertraglichen Schuldverhältnisse durch Rom II

Mit der am 11. Juli 2007 verabschiedeten, zum 11. Januar 2009 in Kraft tretenden sog "Rom II-Verordnung" werden weite Teile des bis dahin überwiegend auf autonome oder staatsvertragliche Wurzeln zurückgehenden Kollisionsrechts der au?ervertraglichen Schuldverh?ltnisse europaweit einheitlich neu geregelt. Die auf diese Weise erreichte Rechtsharmonisierung stellt nicht zuletzt mit Blick auf die inhaltliche Bandbreite der Regelungsgegenst?nde einen Meilenstein in der Vergemeinschaftung des internationalen Privatrechts dar. Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht – erstmals seit Verabschiedung der Verordnung – die zu erwartenden Auswirkungen auf die geltende ?sterreichische Rechtslage.     

Asymmetric contests with liquidity constraints

We consider two bidders with asymmetric valuations competing to win an exogenous prize. Capital markets are imperfect, such that the contestants possibly face a liquidity constraint. We show that aggregate investments are lower if at least one bidder has a liquidity constraint, even if the low-valuation bidder possibly increases his/her investments. Furthermore, the effect of the high-valuation bidder’s liquidity constraint on competitive balance is ambiguous. However, if the low-valuation bidder is constrained, greater wealth unambiguously increases competitive balance. Surprisingly, if the low-valuation bidder has a constraint, a tighter constraint can increase his/her profit.