Hypocrisy as a crisis response? Assessing changes in talk,decisions, and actions of the European Commission in EU environmental policy

In this article, we assess the changing role of the European Commission in EU environmental policy. In line with organizational theory, we expect organizational hypocrisy, namely a decoupling of talk, decisions, and actions, to characterize the Commission's behaviour in the aftermath of the financial and economic crisis. We analyse the extent to which the Commission (1) promotes environmental matters and concepts in press releases and public statements; (2) proposes new and stricter environmental policy changes; and (3) takes action against member states in cases of non-compliance between the years 2000 and 2016. Our empirical analysis reveals that the Commission has indeed moved towards a pattern of hypocritical policy entrepreneurship in the post-crisis period. We argue that the decoupling of talk, decision, and action allows the European Commission to keep up its reputation as an environmental policy entrepreneur while, at the same, satisfying member states’ preference for economic recovery and less environmental regulation.     

Regulatory policy outputs and impacts: Exploring a complex relationship

In this article, we pursue the objective of empirically testing the extent to which changes in environmental policy outputs can explain changes in environmental impacts. Previously, systematic testing of this relationship was hampered by the lack of a compelling measurement of changes in regulatory policy outputs. To remedy this, we present a novel approach to the measurement of events of regulatory output change. We illustrate our concept by employing data on changes in clean air regulations in 24 advanced democracies from 1976 to 2003. In a next step, we explore the extent to which changes in clean air regulations can account for changes in air pollutant emissions. The empirical analysis suggests that changes in clean air regulations cannot be unconditionally associated with changing intensities of air pollutant emission. We deem these results to have far‐reaching implications for the study of regulatory policy change.     

Austerity or welfare state transformation? Examining the impact of economic crises on social regulation in Europe

This article provides an encompassing analysis of how economic crises affect social regulation. The analysis is based on an innovative dataset that covers policy output changes in 13 European countries over a period of 34 years (1980–2013) in the areas of pensions, unemployment, and child benefits. By performing a negative binomial regression analysis, we show that economic crises do matter for social policymaking. Our main empirical finding is that crises impinge on social regulation by opening a window of opportunity that facilitates the dismantling of social policy standards. Yet crisis‐induced policy dismantling is restricted to adjustments based on existing policy instruments. We do not find significant variation in policymaking patterns across different macroeconomic conditions for the more structural elements of social policy portfolios, such as the envisaged social policy targets or the policy instruments applied. This suggests that economic crises do not lead to a profound transformation of the welfare state but to austerity.     

Registration Fees for Same-Sex Unions,Local Party Politics and Societal Demand

This article addresses registration fees for same-sex unions and the number of registered gay couples in the German state of Baden-Württemberg. In contrast to the other 15 German states, in Baden-Württemberg each administrative district decides independently about the level of registration fees. Consequently, there is not only considerable variation of the number of registered gay couples across the individual administrative units, but also among the registration fees, which we seek to explain by relying on theories of public administration, policy analysis and political economy. Our findings show that the varying levels of registration fees for same-sex unions are primarily determined by the preferences of parties in the regional legislative committees. In this way, we can demonstrate that the definition of registration fees is politicised, which contradicts the legal principles of equivalency and cost recovery.