Majoritarian logic

The analogues to Pareto dominance and Pareto superiority, majority dominance and Majority superiority, allow restriction on the domain of outcomes for majority-rule choices. The logical structure of the argument extends and confirms the proposition that the effective alternatives for collective choice are endogenously determined by the existent rule for making choices. Orthodox public choice theory has, explicitly or implicitly, presumed that the choice alternatives are exogenous to the rule through which choices are made.     

Bureaucratic choice and nonoptimal provision of public goods: Theory and evidence

Local governments' allocation decisions are modeled in the context of a slack maximizing bureaucrat who produces public goods according to a production function that includes both provision and the constituents' socio-economic characteristics. To gain a better understanding of the determinants of slack, comparative statics and an empirical study of Illinois municipalities are conducted. The indirect output distance function provides efficiency scores upon which we regress several variables, representing socio-economic characteristics, costs and competition measures. We find that slack or inefficient behavior is associated with richer communities, lower education levels and a lack of competition for residents among municipalities.     

Intervention and Empire: John Stuart Mill and International Relations

It is surprising that John Stuart Mill's international thought, which focuses on intervention and empire, has not attracted the attention it warrants. It is particularly surprising that Mill has been largely overlooked by the English School, whose members acutely appreciate the contributions of classical political philosophers to international discourse. Galvanised by his introspection on his life, especially the impact of interference in his psychological and intellectual development, to his analysis of the impact of Britain on India's princely states and intervention in civil wars, Mill identified timeless problems intrinsic to international relations whilst profoundly appreciating the tensions they generated in the form of perverse effects, unintended consequences and moral hazard. Contemporary international relations are replete with examples of the unforeseen and unforeseeable developments that attend intervention and interference. If a concern of the English School is the tormenting decisions that fall to statesmen, Mill provides an understanding of the considerations that vastly complicate such decisions.     

Manufactured Responsiveness: The Impact of State Electoral Laws on Unified Party Control of the Presidency and House of Representatives, 1840–1940

The modern history of divided government in America suggests that the framers succeeded in creating a government unresponsive to popular passions. Yet in the nineteenth century the party winning the presidency almost always captured control of the House of Representatives. Why and how could nineteenth century national elections be so responsive that they resemble parliamentary outcomes? We identify electoral institutions present in the states that directly linked congressional elections to presidential coattails. Specifically, we estimate the impact of state ballot laws and the strategic design of congressional districts on presidential coattail voting from 1840 to 1940. We find that presidential elections, as mediated by state electoral laws, strongly account for unified party control of the House and the presidency throughout the nineteenth century.     

Political Trust, Ideology, and Public Support for Government Spending

This article analyzes the relationship between political trust, ideology, and public support for government spending. We argue that the political trust heuristic is activated when individuals are asked to sacrifice ideological as well as material interests. Aggregate- and individual-level analysis shows that the effects of political trust on support for government spending are moderated by ideology. Consistent with the unbalanced ideological costs imposed by requests for increased government spending, we find that the effects of political trust are significantly more pronounced among conservatives than among liberals. The analysis further demonstrates that ideology conditions the effects of political trust on attitudes toward both distributive and redistributive spending. Our findings suggest that political trust has policy consequences across a much broader range of policy issues than previously thought.