Global Britain and the Narrative of Empire

Since 2016, the UK government has outlined plans for ‘Global Britain’ as a framework for post‐Brexit foreign policy. Some criticise the idea as a vision of ‘Empire 2.0’, but it is rarely made clear exactly what form it takes or what its wider political implications are. This article argues that Global Britain constitutes not just an idea or a slogan, but a foreign policy narrative and, more specifically, the narrative of empire. Indeed, to appear reasonable its grand ambitions require pre‐existing knowledges of past imperial ‘successes’ and accepting images of empire among the British public. Yet Global Britain lacks efficacy: as a domestic rather than an international narrative, by being inherently regressive in its worldview, and for contradicting the preferences of international partners on which the UK heavily relies. These narrative flaws, it is argued, make Global Britain an actively problematic, rather than merely ineffective, component of UK foreign policy.     

A Tri-Directional Examination of Parental Personality,Parenting Behaviors,and Contextual Factors in Influencing Adolescent Behavioral Outcomes

Journal of Youth and Adolescence - Links between parental personality, parenting, and adolescent behavior have been well established. However, extant research is limited by the sole focus on...     

From D.C. to Little Rock: Welfare Reform at Mid-term

Following an active period of state welfare reforms, passageof the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) programin 1996 gave states great flexibility, set up block-grant financing,and imposed work-related mandates. Under TANF, states increasedtheir work expectations for recipients; improved work incentives;and provided more work supports, such as child care and transportationassistance. Caseloads have dropped sharply, and most formerrecipients are finding work. Caseload declines in most stateshave resulted in substantial funding being available for newand expanded services, including supports for working poor familiesand early-childhood and after-school programs. Most states havebeen slower to develop these programs, but the pace is increasingas policymakers become more secure about TANF's flexibilityand the magnitude of the caseload changes.     

Seeing Like an Orientalist State: The Three Deaths of Neda Agha-Soltan

On June 20, 2009 one image became a symbol of violence, as well as a rallying cry for a movement that contested the disputed election of hardline Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The image captured the murder of a 26 year old protester named Neda Agha-Soltan, and showed a first-hand account, in bloody detail, of the savagery of state killing. With the help of social media, the video received mass attention from news organizations in the United States by June 22, 2009. Cursory analysis of the New York Times and The Washington Post, representation of Neda’s death, reveals an Iranian government that was unafraid to violently repress a democratic movement. It is my contention here that such a construction was framed by an Orientalist discourse which helped to fabricate three distinct deaths of this murdered protester. First the lasting images of death became a symbol of freedom; Neda’s second death showed a grievable life, one that provided an emotional space for a US audience; and finally her third death which became a means of defining and (re)stabilizing Orientalized perceptions of Iran as violent and barbaric. Ultimately, these three deaths became an instrument that would help justify the call for US intervention on behalf of Western morality and humanitarian aid.     

Taming mammon: corporate social responsibility and the global regulation of conflict trade

Unethical business practices, the conduct of corrupt rulers and conflict entrepreneurs in conflict-prone societies have provoked genuine humanitarian concern from NGOs and activists who constitute the main driving force behind calls for ethical markets. However, powerful players, such as western multinational corporations and OECD governments, have been able to undercut campaigns for compulsory legal regulatory codes by promoting industry self-regulation and voluntary codes of conduct. This article assesses a number of these initiatives to control the trade in conflict goods and promote good resource governance. It concludes that current mechanisms constitute a weak attempt to control the negative impacts of the market and, by failing to tackle the real causes of instability, are inadequate for building a political economy of peace.