Subjects with agency? Children’s participation in family law proceedings

Galvanised by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, many jurisdictions now recognise children’s rights to participate in decisions that affect them. While such legal rights have increased, research on family law proceedings shows how children’s views can still be undermined, ignored or not even sought in decisions about them. This article uses the academic resources of childhood studies, to consider dominant and alternative narratives of children’s participation within Scottish family law. Drawing upon reported case law and empirical research, the article concludes that children’s participation gains protection by being institutionalised but children’s participation is attenuated because it is not recognised as relational and contextual. As rationality, consistency and autonomy are privileged, the weight given to children’s views is lessened by concerns about children being manipulated or distressed. Courts and their decisions may be child-focused, centring on children’s welfare, but they are not child-inclusive, involving children in decision-making.     

The Relevance of Intention to Criminal Wrongdoing

In this paper, we defend the general thesis that intentions are relevant not only to moral permissibility and impermissibility, but also to criminal wrongdoing, as well as a specific version of the Doctrine of Double Effect that we believe can help solve some challenging puzzles in the criminal law. We begin by answering some recent arguments that marginalize or eliminate the role of intentions as components of criminal wrongdoing [e.g., Alexander and Ferzan (Crime and culpability: a theory of criminal law. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009), Chiao (Crim Law Philos 4:37–55, 2010), Walen (Crim Law Philos 3:71–78, 2009)]. We then turn to some influential theories that articulate a direct role for intentions [e.g., Duff (Answering for crime: responsibility and liability in the criminal law. Hart Publishing, Portland, 2007), Husak (Crim Law Philos 3:51–70, 2009)]. While we endorse the commitment to such a role for intentions, we believe that extant theories have not yet been able to adequately address certain objections or solve certain puzzles, such as that some attempt convictions require criminal intent when the crime attempted, if successful, requires only foresight, and that some intended harms appear to be no more serious than non-intended ones of the same magnitude, for example. Drawing on a variety of resources, including the specific version of the Doctrine of Double Effect we have developed in recent published work, we present solutions to these puzzles, which in turn provide mutual support for our general approach to the role of intentions and for thinking that using others as means is itself a special kind of wrongdoing.     

Estimating actual foot size from a static bare foot print in a White British Population

In forensic intelligence-gathering it would be useful to be able to estimate the size of a perpetrator's foot from a standing bare footprint found at the scene of crime. Currently, the advice is to add a fixed amount to the length of the footprint (typically 1.5 or 2.0 cm), but there is little evidence for this approach. This study used measured footprint and actual foot lengths from 146 participants from the white British student population of a University in the UK. Data were analysed using multiple regression with foot length as the dependent (outcome) variable and footprint length and sex as the independent variable/factor respectively. Sex was not a significant predictor. The regression equation for the best estimate of the foot length is 19.89 + 0.95 × print length ± 8 mm.     

Detention and treatment down under: human rights and mental health laws in Australia and New Zealand

Mental health law reform in recent decades has drawn on the international human rights movement. The entering into force of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on May 3 2008 has been hailed by some as signalling a new era in relation to how domestic mental health laws should be reformed. Both Australia and New Zealand have ratified the CRPD and Australia has acceded to its Optional Protocol. New Zealand and the Australian Capital Territory and Victoria have statutory bills of rights which have an interpretive effect, but are unable to render other statutes invalid. Drawing on the results of interviews conducted with fifty-two representatives of consumer and carer organisations, lawyers, and mental health professionals across Australia and New Zealand, this paper examines the current thinking on human rights and mental health laws in these countries and outlines what changes, if any, may be brought to domestic legislation in light of the Convention.