Responding to mental distress in the Third World: Cultural imperialism or the struggle for synthesis?

This paper questions the appropriateness of some of the 'help' that has already been given in mental health in 'developing' countries, particularly Africa, and examines some of the complex ideological issues underlying different cultural understandings of the aetiology and treatment of mental illness. Some personal experiences, illustrating examples of the imposition of culturally inappropriate ideology in the teaching of psychiatry, are described. In conclusion, some principles of good practice are suggested which could form the basis of a synthesis between cultures, and maximise the possibility of Western aid in the field of mental distress being more culturally appropriate.     

The Rise of Digital Justice: Courtroom Technology,Public Participation and Access to Justice

This article addresses a little discussed yet fundamentally important aspect of legal technological transformation: the rise of digital justice in the courtroom. Against the backdrop of the government's current programme of digital court modernisation in England and Wales, it examines the implications of advances in courtroom technology for fair and equitable public participation, and access to justice. The article contends that legal reforms have omitted any detailed consideration of the type and quality of citizen participation in newly digitised court processes which have fundamental implications for the legitimacy and substantive outcomes of court‐based processes; and for enhancing democratic procedure through improved access to justice. It is argued that although digital court tools and systems offer great promise for enhancing efficiency, participation and accessibility, they simultaneously have the potential to amplify the scope for injustice, and to attenuate central principles of the legal system, including somewhat paradoxically, access to justice.     

Revoking consent: A ‘blind spot’ in data protection law?

The flow of personal data throughout the public and private sectors is central to the functioning of modern society. The processing of these data is, however, increasingly being viewed as a major concern, particularly in light of many recent high profile data losses. It is generally assumed that individuals have a right to withdraw, or revoke, their consent to the processing of their personal data by others; however this may not be straightforward in practice, or addressed adequately by the law. Examination of the creation of data protection legislation in Europe and the UK, and its relationship with human rights law, suggests that such a general right to withdraw consent was assumed to be inbuilt, despite the lack of express provisions in both the European Data Protection Directive and UK Data Protection Act. In this article we highlight potential shortcomings in the provisions that most closely relate to this right in the UK Act. These raise questions as to the extent of meaningful rights of revocation, and thus rights of informational privacy, afforded to individuals in a democratic society.