Discrimination and ethnic conflict: a dyadic analysis of politically-excluded groups in sub-Saharan Africa

ABSTRACT

The literature on political exclusion and conflict tends to treat grievance-based mechanisms with broad-brush strokes and does not differentiate between types of political exclusion. This study disaggregates politically-excluded groups into two subgroups: groups that experience political discrimination from the state, and groups without political power that are not explicitly discriminated against. We posit that discriminated groups are more likely to experience grievances and therefore are more prone to conflict than excluded groups that are not actively discriminated against. We further posit that the effect of discrimination on conflict is moderated by interactions with economic inequalities and the share of elites. Using dyadic data for 155 ethnic groups in 28 Sub-Saharan African countries, we find that among politically-excluded groups it is indeed discriminated groups that are responsible for most of the association between political exclusion and conflict. Groups that face active, intentional, and targeted discrimination by the state are significantly more likely to be involved in conflict than excluded groups who do not face this explicit form of discrimination. Additionally, we find that discriminated groups who also experience economic inequalities are less likely to engage in conflict, whilst an increased presence of elites within discriminated groups can precipitate the chances of conflict.     

The regulatory state in developing countries: Redistribution and regulatory failure in Brazil

Following the traditional doctrine of the “regulatory state”, regulatory agencies should be given very focused mandates and stay away from the politicized realm of distributive policies and decisions. An opposing perspective would state that if regulatory agencies can contribute to economic redistribution, positive results such as network expansion, economies of scale, and fiscal efficiency will ultimately lead to lower levels of regulatory failure. This article tests whether, in countries of high socio-economic inequality, such as Brazil, the active incorporation of distributive considerations by regulatory agencies leads to lower levels of failure. Through the analysis of the activities of seven Brazilian network regulatory agencies, the article develops theory-driven expectations and tests these expectations using crisp set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA). It concludes that not prioritizing redistribution is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for regulatory agencies' failure. In most types of failure, a lack of priority to redistribution leads to failure when combined with low regulatory capacity and low levels of competence.     

An Aquatic Decomposition Scoring Method to Potentially Predict the Postmortem Submersion Interval of Bodies Recovered from the North Sea

This study aimed to develop an aquatic decomposition scoring (ADS) method and investigated the predictive value of this method in estimating the postmortem submersion interval (PMSI) of bodies recovered from the North Sea. This method, consisting of an ADS item list and a pictorial reference atlas, showed a high interobserver agreement (Krippendorff's alpha ≥ 0.93) and hence proved to be valid. This scoring method was applied to data, collected from closed cases—cases in which the postmortal submersion interval (PMSI) was known—concerning bodies recovered from the North Sea from 1990 to 2013. Thirty‐eight cases met the inclusion criteria and were scored by quantifying the observed total aquatic decomposition score (TADS). Statistical analysis demonstrated that TADS accurately predicts the PMSI (p < 0.001), confirming that the decomposition process in the North Sea is strongly correlated to time.     

The geopolitical overlay of the hydropolitics of the Harirud River Basin

This paper explores the geopolitical overlay that is shaping dynamic hydropolitical interactions of the Harirud River Basin, which is a basin that spans Afghanistan, Iran and Turkmenistan. This paper argues that the control and capture of water resources are not solely for economic development but rather for geopolitical reasons that serve the security interests of the actors involved, particularly outside-basin powers like the US and India. The Afghan Government similarly views dams as symbols of nation-building and a way of staying in power. In the absence of a lasting trilateral agreement, the existing nature of the geopolitical dynamics of the basin has led upstream Afghanistan and downstream Iran and Turkmenistan to unilaterally establish their rights to control the “rules of the game”. This paper suggests that sustainable solutions will not be reached unless the geopolitical nature of the basin and outside interventions can center on a normative understanding of the regional interests, identities, and commonalities of all the riparian states.     

Bounded rationality and social interaction in negotiating a climate agreement

An agreement on climate change mitigation hinges on large-scale international cooperation. Rational agents are supposed to consider the cost and benefits of cooperation, which then determine their negotiation positions. Behavioral economics provides experimental evidence that decision-making in negotiation-like situations is influenced by systematic cognitive biases and social interaction. In this paper, we examine the impact of bounded rationality and social preferences on bargaining in international climate negotiations and illustrate how particular deviations from full rationality affect the incentives to cooperate. Of special interest are fairness preferences for burden-sharing rules and behavioral responses to different framings of climate change and policy, as well as implications of these for communication about climate change. The analysis will further address different levels of representation, including individual citizens, politicians, experts, and (professional) negotiators. The consequences of the most prominent nonstandard preferences and biases for negotiating a climate treaty are assessed, and specific strategies to foster cooperation are suggested.     

Ab alio ictu(s): Misconceptions about Julian's View on Causation

The Roman jurists’ treatment of the problem of the ‘supervening cause’ has been the subject of many publications in the second half of this century.¹ In particular, an alleged controversy between Celsus and Julian has been singled out. It is suggested in this essay that the discussions have constantly erred in the translation of D. 9.2.51 pr. (Julian). This has often led to a misconception of Julian's opinion on the matter. When closely read, Julian's words, as reproduced in D. 9.2.51, leave room for the view that Celsus and Julian either did not disagree at all or in any case did not disagree on the matter of the ‘supervening cause’.     

Schools with a Difference: Policy Discourses and Education Reform in Britain and Germany

Throughout the 1990s, corruption cases, policy failure and scandals tarnished Belgium's international reputation. In this article, we analyse the effect of federalism and political culture on corruption and policy failures and their impact on the likelihood of such occurrences becoming scandals. Survey material suggests that there are few differences between French- and Dutch-speakers in the perception and tolerance of corruption. We then list a number of variables that can explain corruption in Belgium and argue that the independent effect of federalism is very limited. Next we demonstrate that federalism has played a much more significant role in lowering the risk of policy failure, while at the same time creating a few new vulnerabilities. Finally, we argue that the regional political elites do not often engage in policy learning and frequently put forward federalism as the main solution to the avoidance of policy failure and scandal. In this sense, regional political elites do not seize the opportunity for policy experimentation and transfer that is generally seen as one of the main virtues of a federal system of government.     

T2 Transfer of high technology from the united states to the soviet bloc: A public policy issue

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Soviet-bloc states are engaged in an extensive effort in the legal as well as illegal acquisition of United States high technology. This study examines the importance to the U. S. of such losses; the manner in which the Soviets acquire our high technology; benefits of such acquisitions to the Soviet Union; steps being taken by the U. S. to reduce its loss of high technology; and the author's recommended course of action to reduce high-technology transfer.

The transfer of U. S. high technology to the Soviet Union is recognized as one of our most serious national security problems. This problem is complicated, however, when considering our free enterprise system and the need to promote free trade. On the one hand high technology represents a substantial share of our current exports, while on the other, the United States has relied on technological superiority to offset the Soviet-bloc edge in military might. An equilibrium must be established to ensure protection of both economic and national defense interests of the United States.

The Soviet effort to acquire U. S. high technology is broad based, supported by the Military-Industrial Commission and State Committee for Science and Technology (in legal acquisitions), as well as the Soviet Intelligence Service (in illegal acquisitions). Such techniques as review of U. S. publications, U. S.-Soviet exchange programs, as well as extensive clandestine intelligence operations, are utilized by the Soviets in obtaining our high technology.

The Soviet acquisition of U. S. high technology has greatly benefited the USSR. This is clearly seen in U. S. Government estimates that the Soviets may have saved as much as $100 million in research and development of advanced microcircuitry. Several examples of savings to the Soviet defense industry as a result of high-technology transfer are elucidated in this work. In short, the Soviets have been able to save billions of defense dollars by utilizing proven U. S. designs with none of the risks experienced in the research and development of this technology.

Because of the paradoxical nature of this question of high-technology transfer, U. S. Congressional reaction to renewal of the Export Administration Act of 1979 has been mixed. On one side of the aisle, there has been support of looser controls on high-technology exports to promote free trade. On the other side of the aisle, tighter controls on such exports have been supported to protect critical U. S. high technology. At the same time, the U. S. Government has undertaken steps to strengthen its agreement with the COCOM nations. Another effort undertaken by the U. S. and other Western governments is the expulsion of accused Soviet spies from various Soviet diplomatic establishments (at least 67 Soviets from January to May, 1983). Additionally, the U. S. Department of State, Defense, Commerce, and Customs, as well as the American Intelligence Community, have undertaken efforts to reduce high-technology transfer to the Soviet Union. U. S. industry has attempted to increase security of high-technology; however, because of the Defense Investigative Service's workload, the quality of background investigations on individuals, working in firms handling defense contracts, has suffered.

The author recommends establishment of an ad-hoc matrix organization to integrate the resources and efforts of all of the federal agencies, as well as industry, in controlling the transfer of U. S. high technology to the Soviet Union and Soviet-bloc states. The author also includes recommendations as contained in various Congressional bills. The author's suggestions are made with a view toward creating a balance necessary to the protection of our free market system and protection of the national defense of the United States.