Rules and games

This paper reconsiders the relationship between the rules of a game and its outcomes. We develop a notion of rule reform that leads to the selection of Pareto improved equilibria points. We then apply this notion to a series of naturally occurring fishing rules, including examples from Malaysia, India, Brazil, Turkey, and Canada. We show that reforming a game is conceptually akin to reforming an economy.     

We demand work! ‘Dispossession’, patronage and village labour in Bibiyana,Bangladesh

ABSTRACT

This paper critically appraises the usefulness of idioms and theories of ‘dispossession’ to describe changes taking place in rural Bangladesh, where rapid industrialization and ‘development’ have led to profound shifts in the agrarian economy. On the basis of long-term fieldwork in north-eastern Bangladesh, where the multinational company Chevron operate a large gas field, I argue that rather than political and economic struggles in the area involving access to land, it is access to work which is now all important for livelihoods and, as such, has become the basis for local patronage and political power. Theories of ‘accumulation by dispossession’, still widely cited in the anthropology of neo-liberal development in South Asia, are thus of limited help in explaining the changes and continuities which animate local political and economic struggles.     

MOVING INTO GLOBAL COMPETITION: A Case Study of Alabama's Recruitment of Mercedes-Benz

Globalization is changing the game of economic development, but the emerging rules and optimal strategies remain somewhat unclear. The Mercedes case discussed in this article illustrates the rough and uncertain nature of this transition. From the perspective of the traditional strategy, the price of the jobs initially promised by Mercedes seemed high; and the ultimate cost was increased by the intense competition among the bidding states. Yet from another perspective, the incentives offered by Alabama can be viewed as “table stakes” for the new global game of economic development.     

Weekly community interviews with high-risk participants: operational issues

To address several key questions in social science research, repeated interviews of individuals drawn from difficult populations are required. This article describes an approach for addressing the challenges associated with longitudinal interview studies, including locating research participants, obtaining reliable and valid interview data over time, and retaining participants across the course of the study. We applied this approach to conduct a study designed to identify changeable risk factors for violence among high-risk people with mental illness. To successfully conduct weekly interviews of these individuals in the community across a 6-month period, we developed a flexible and personalized interview format; carefully selected, trained, and supervised staff; and developed incentives to maximize participant retention. Each of these three steps is discussed as a guide for future longitudinal studies that involve interviewing difficult populations.     

Greener and cleaner? The signaling accuracy of U.S. voluntary environmental programs

Voluntary environmental programs (VEPs) have become a popular alternative to traditional regulation. However, little is known about whether these programs are sending accurate signals about the environmental practices of their participants. As a means for understanding signaling accuracy, this research investigates VEP design characteristics. The findings suggest that there are four distinct types of programs with varying degrees of rigor. Because information for differentiating among program types is limited, less rigorous VEPs can signal that their administrative, environmental performance and conformance requirements are comparable to programs with more robust designs. Further, the lack of monitoring and sanctions in less rigorous programs create opportunities for participants to free-ride and receive benefits without satisfying VEP requirements. Unless some means of distinguishing among program types is implemented, these issues can threaten the long term viability of VEPs as a tool for environmental protection, and the credibility of market mechanisms more broadly.