Explaining the failure of the ASEAN economic community: the primacy of domestic political economy

All reliable indicators suggest that ASEAN's (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Economic Community (AEC) will not be successfully established by its 2015 deadline. Why? Against technocratic, realist and constructivist accounts, this article offers an explanation rooted in the political economy of ASEAN's member-states. Economic liberalisation agreements promote the rescaling of economic governance, involving regulatory changes that may radically redistribute power and resources. Consequently, they are heavily contested between coalitions of social and political forces, without outcomes reflecting the outcome of these struggles. The argument is demonstrated by exploring the uneven sectoral liberalisation achieved under the AEC, the constrained integration of ASEAN's energy markets, and the limited deregulation of skilled labour migration.     

Congressional dysfunction: An information processing perspective

The public's approval of Congress is at an all time low. The parties seem to have taken the legislative process hostage for their own electoral gain. Whereas traditional arguments about congressional dysfunction focus on polarized voting coalitions or outputs – particularly legislation – in this article we highlight congressional information processing and how it has changed in this highly partisan era. By coding congressional hearings according to the kind of information on which they focus, we find that members of Congress are receiving one‐sided information to a greater degree and are spending less time learning about potential solutions. We use these results to make numerous recommendations for improving how Congress gathers its information.     

Space for stories: legislative narratives and the establishment of the US Space Force

Policy Sciences - In June 2018, President Trump directed the development of a sixth branch of the US Armed Forces—the Space Force—whose primary mission is to enhance the space...     

Vacuum metal deposition: developing latent fingerprints on polyethylene substrates after the deposition of excess gold.

A previously identified difficulty with the development of latent fingerprints on low-density polyethylene (LDPE) by vacuum metal deposition (VMD) is that excess gold deposition prevents effective zinc deposition and so inhibits latent print development [1]. The investigation of a means to correct for excess gold deposition was the basis for this study. Exposure to zinc and the readmission of air into the vacuum chamber followed by VMD development results in the deactivation of the initial gold clusters due to the formation of zinc oxide and the adsorption of air and water molecules. As a result, the majority of the gold deposited during the second treatment creates new gold clusters rather than adding to the gold clusters previously formed. After excess gold deposition on LDPE, the deposition of 1.5 times the optimum gold amount will result in good-quality normal development. The results also indicate that, on all surfaces, at least twice the initial gold count should be used for re-treatment when further development is required after air has been readmitted to the chamber.     

Veto Players Revisited: Internal and External Factors Influencing Policy Production

Veto player models generally rely on two assumptions: (1) collective actors like political parties behave as individual actors; and (2) all actors influencing policy production are domestic. Yet these are often violated by empirical reality. Under certain institutions, parties are less cohesive and may not behave as individuals, and international regimes can have considerable influence over legislation. Using data on labor‐law production in Europe, we find that the effects of veto players are conditional on both party cohesion and international regimes. Future conceptualizations of veto players should be more sensitive to both internal and external institutional configurations.     

An Integrated Theory of Budgetary Politics and Some Empirical Tests: The U.S. National Budget, 1791–2010

We develop a general theory of budgetary politics and examine its implications on a new data set on U.S. government expenditures from 1791 to 2010. We draw on three major approaches to budgeting: decision‐making theories, primarily incrementalism and serial processing; policy process models; and path dependency. We show that the incrementalist budget model is recursive and that its solution is exponential growth, and isolate three periods in which it operates in pure form. The equilibrium periods are separated by critical junctures, associated with wars or economic collapse. We assess policy process dynamics by examining the deviations within equilibrium periods. We offer three takeaways: (1) exponential incrementalism is fundamental to a theory of budgeting; (2) disjoint shifts in the level of exponential incrementalism are caused only by critical moments; (3) temporally localized dynamics cause bends in the exponential path, longer returns to the path within budgetary eras, and annual punctuations in budget changes.     

State Performance‐Based Budgeting in Boom and Bust Years: An Analytical Framework and Survey of the States

The authors examine the track record of applying performance‐based budgeting (PBB) across three time periods within a sample of U.S. state governments: (1) throughout the 1990s, (2) in the early 2000s, and (3) during the Great Recession. State‐level PBB is analyzed according to four elements: (1) the development of performance measures, (2) its applicability to budgeting and management processes, (3) its utility across the business cycle, and (4) its usefulness for budget players. An analytical framework is devised that highlights the “publicness” of American government, draws on the principal–agent model, and considers incentive mechanisms theory. Findings confirm that a good performance measurement system takes time to develop and operate well and that PBB functions more effectively for executive management than legislative purposes. PBB is used more by the states during strong economic times as opposed to during economic downturns. More importantly, PBB is only selectively applied by legislators in most states, whereas top executive policy makers, middle managers, and staff embrace and utilize PBB systems more extensively.