Bureaucratic capacity and state-society relations in China

In view of the efforts of post-Mao state-rebuilding, how does bureaucratic capacity affect the pattern of state-society interaction in China, where a robust civil society is still missing? Using the case of China’s population control, we analyze the linkage between bureaucratic capacity and state-society relations. The study demonstrates remarkable resilience of the party-state and its transformative thrust in reformist China. Through a mix of mass mobilization and institutional building, the Chinese state remains puissant in extending social control over its people. Equally important, bureaucratic capacity is a major predictor of state coerciveness. Other things being equal, localities with stronger bureaucratic capacity tend to develop a less antagonist and more cooperative state-society relationship. Bureaucratic capacity can serve as remedy to despotic or authoritarian rule despite the lack of an autonomous civil society. This finding has important implications for the potential of democratization in China.     

Error minimization and deterrence in agency control

In the presented oversight model, in which a regulatory agency may collude with regulatees, a watchdog organization may scrutinize the agency’s decision-making and find evidence speaking for collusive behavior. Found evidence is of a specific, stochastic quality. Courts will overturn the administrative decision when the evidence presented in court exceeds a minimum quality standard set by the political principal. Lowering the quality standard increases the odds of finding evidence of sufficient quality and, hence, leads to increasing collusion deterrence and to a lower probability of acquitting collusive administrators (type I error), but also to a higher probability of convicting an innocent administrator (type II error). It is shown that, when welfare-maximization gives rise to an interior solution, the welfare-maximizing standard of evidence is lower than the one that merely minimizes the costs of legal errors without taking deterrence costs into account, but will imply incomplete deterrence. However, conditions can and will be identified under which both error cost minimization and complete deterrence coincide with welfare-maximization.     

检察监督原则另论

检察监督原则是我国检察权配置的基本方案和原则。根据检察监督原则的要求,检察权本质上是一种法律监督权,检察院可以对公安机关和法院进行监督。但是,从检察权本身的性质和特征来分析,检察监督原则的法理合理性却值得质疑。     

高效薄层色谱法检测尿中硝西泮的代谢物7-氨基硝西泮

目的 建立用高效薄层色谱法定性及半定量测定人尿中硝西泮的代谢物7-氨基硝西泮(7ANIZ)含量的方法。方法 人口服治疗量10 mg硝西泮后,在pH 9条件下用乙醚进行提取,分析物斑点用氟罗里丝进行荧光显色,紫外灯下(366nm)观察荧光斑点;根据斑点荧光显色情况及强度进行7ANIZ定性及半定量检测。结果 尿中硝西泮代谢物7ANIZ检出限为5 ng/ml,测量限为15 ng/ml。结论 人口服治疗量10 mg硝西泮,用高效薄层色谱法可定性及半定量测定48 h内排泄尿中的7ANIZ。