Book reviews

Michael Rywkin, Ed., Russian Colonial Expansion to 1917, Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Monograph Series Number 1, The Association for the Study of the Nationalities (USSR and East Europe) Incorporated, Series in Issues Studies Number 4, Rein Taagepera, Preface. London: Mansell Publishing, 1988, xviii + 274 pp., $45.00.

Helene Carrere, D'Encausse, Islam and the Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asia, Comparative Studies on Muslim Societies, No. 8, Maxime Rodinson, Preface, Quintin Hoare, Trans. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1988, xix + 267 pp., $40.00.     

Economic performance and political popularity in the Republic of Ireland

This paper develops a model of discrete choice to analyse the choice of voters among a number of political parties. It then applies the model to an empirical analysis of the relationship between a government's economic performance and its political popularity for the Republic of Ireland over the period 1974–1987.Within this general statement the paper makes three contributions. First, it sheds light on a hitherto unknown phenomenon — namely the nature of the relation between economic performance and political popularity in Ireland. Second, it does this within the context of analysing the reactions of different types of voters viz. voters of all social classes and then of social classes ABC1 and C2DE. Third, the empirical work is grounded firmly in a choice theoretic model involving optimal choices between discrete alternatives.     

China: Administrative Corruption — Experience in a Comparative Context

As a new world economy emerges what is being learned about the accompanying phenomenon of administrative corruption? To probe this question we combine study of current developments in China with prevailing theories of corruption. The administrative corruption experience, as it has unfolded during the economic development thrust of the Deng reform era, is described and analysed in a comparative context. In specifically interjecting the American experience we suggest that a balanced control response to corruption —rather than an elimination focus—could be a fruitful avenue for policy and research, and that informal, social approaches to corruption control are pregnant with possibilities. China's experience offers a significant opportunity to push the margin of wisdom on these issues as they relate to economic and political development.     

Price discrimination in a rent-seeking economy

This paper examines the incentive and the consequences of using discriminatory pricing by a monopolist in a rent-seeking economy. It is shown that, even if all consumer groups' demands have identical elasticities at any given price, the monopolist has an incentive to charge a lower price to high pressure consumer groups so as to alleviate their rent-seeking efforts in challenging its monopolistic power. Furthermore, it is shown that by allowing the firm to price discriminate total welfare may increase, even if all rent-seeking expenditures are completely wasteful.     

Friends in high places: The wealth effects of JFK's assassination on the assets of LBJ's supporters

This paper uses anecdotal evidence to identify a group of firms that had significant ties to President Lyndon Johnson and determines the effect of Johnson's unexpected rise to the Presidency on the market value of these firms. The unexpected nature of President Kennedy's death eliminates the confounding event problem typically associated with election results. We are able to identify four separate portfolios of firms that had political ties to Lyndon Johnson. Our research suggests that the market expected significant benefits to accrue to these firms as a result of Johnson's becoming President. When Catholic John Kennedy and Johnson were running together in 1960 a joke hop-scotched around the parties in Texas and Washington that Kennedy had told Johnson, “Lyndon, when we get elected I'm going to dig a tunnel to the Vatican,” and Lyndon had replied, “That's OK with me as long as Brown & Root gets the contract” (Dugger, 1982: 286).