A POLICY OF OUR OWN: LOCAL FEMINIST NETWORKS AND SOCIAL SERVICES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN

This article examines the ways in which a feminist family policy agenda has led to significant political action and change within American cities. Feminist groups, during the past fifteen years, became a part of emerging local women's rights policy networks that effected changes in several services for women and children: libraries (programming for women and non-sexist children's literature acquisitions policies); public education (gender equit under Title IX); social welfare (child care and displaced homemaker services); and criminal justice and health (the treatment of the victims of rape and domestic violence). This policy success stems not only from the workings of traditional interest group politics and policy networks but also from the astute use of political symbols, bureaucratic norms, and the federal system.     

INCREASING THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF SEPARATED, DIVORCED, AND WIDOWED WOMEN OVER AGE THIRTY

Data from the Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey and the Current Population Survey were used to estimate the effects of CETA, a governmental jobs program, on the economic well-being of separated, divorced, and widowed women over age thirty. After training, CETA participants had increases in earnings and tended to have higher earnings than comparable CPS respondents. Participants in on-the-job training and public service employment had greater increases than participants in the other CETA programs. CETA enrollees with a high school degree had greater increases in earnings than those who had not completed high school, while whites had greater increases in earnings than non-whites.     

The political process and the use of debt financing by state governments

Empirical evidence offered in this study suggests that decisions by state government officials to effect debt-financed spending depend in part on the state's gubernatorial election cycle. More specifically, the results reveal relative increases in state debt issues in anticipation of elections, and furthermore, they reveal that such increases are more significant for states characterized by high interparty political competition. While theoretical limitations preclude a definitive explanation for these results, the evidence is consistent with a view of state political markets where incumbent parties manipulate public policy so as to enhance the probability of success in pending elections. This insight is significant in that it suggests a relationship between public policy decisions and election cycles in a context heretofore unexplored.