Inconceivable? Deducting the costs of fertility treatment

This Article considers whether infertile taxpayers can deduct their fertility treatment costs as medical expenses under Internal Revenue Code section 213 and whether they should be able to deduct them. Internal Revenue Code section 213 defines medical expenses as "amounts paid-for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body." This definition is interpreted by reference to a baseline of normal biological functioning, which includes reproductive functioning. Most people conceive and bear children without having to incur expenses for fertility treatment. Expenses incurred to approximate the baseline of normal reproductive health are deductible, even if the taxpayer winds up better off, with a child, after the fertility treatment. The medical profession recognizes that infertility is a disease or condition. Infertility is a loss, just as a broken leg is a loss. Fertility treatment costs are thus medical expenses under section 213. In addition, given the existence of the medical expense deduction, taxpayers should be able to deduct the cost of fertility treatments, including IVF, egg donor, and surrogate procedures, under either an "ability-to-pay" or consequentialist normative approach. Reproduction is extremely important to most people. In addition, allowing taxpayers to deduct the costs of fertility treatment will encourage infertile taxpayers to elect the most effective treatment option and reduce the rate of risky multifetal pregnancies. This Article concludes that fertility treatment costs are deductible as medical expenses under current law and should be deductible as medical expenses.     

Constructing universal multiplex PCR systems for comparative genotyping

Analysis of length polymorphisms at STR loci in the human genome has become a standard approach for comparative genotyping in many areas including disease research and diagnostics, parentage assessment, investigations of human diversity, and forensic science. The simultaneous analysis of multiple STR loci through multiplex PCR and multicolor fluorescence detection offers sample conservation, high throughput, and automated genetic analysis. Careful design and optimization of tetranucleotide STR multiplexes has led to reliable, standardized systems that powerfully differentiate and distinguish individual human DNA profiles. The development of these multiplex systems involved a rigorous experimental strategy that included careful selection of PCR primer sequences (for yield, specificity, and multiplex compatability), along with optimization of PCR component concentrations, thermal cycling parameters, and fluorescence detection conditions. This developmental approach rendered well-characterized DNA typing systems that are high performing (sensitive, specific, and balanced), optimized to universal parameters (same reaction conditions), resilient to fluctuations in reaction conditions, and simple to implement and use routinely.     

The Self-Appraisal Questionnaire: a self-report measure for predicting recidivism versus clinician-administered measures: a 5-year follow-up study

In this study, the effectiveness of the Self-Appraisal Questionnaire (SAQ), a self-report measure for predicting release outcome, is examined as compared to clinician-administered and widely used risk prediction measures, over a 5-year period. The SAQ was administered along with four similar, but clinician-administered, measures to 91 federally sentenced Canadian male offenders prior to their release to the community. Follow-up data were collected for a 60-month period. Outcome criteria measures were violent and general recidivism. Results indicated that the SAQ is at least as effective as the four other measures in predicting postrelease outcome. The advantages of using the SAQ as a self-report measure as opposed to clinician-administered measures are discussed.     

From Bakke to Grutter and Gratz: The Supreme Court as a Policymaking Institution

Finding the best means for ensuring equal opportunities for women and minorities has long been controversial and initial efforts to do so were addressed by executive orders, and later the historic Civil Rights Act of 1964. However, this paper argues, since its initial Bakke decision in 1978, it is the Supreme Court that has set policy in this area. In the twenty-five years between that decision and the recent Gratz and Grutter decisions, the court has shifted in its stance, in many cases declaring unconstitutional what it once sanctioned. That shift has not resulted from changes in laws or new amendments to the Constitution, nor can it be seen as reflecting public opinion, as that is not clear-cut. Rather, affirmative action policy has reflected the ideological stances of the justices sitting at the time a decision was rendered. The paper concludes with an assessment as to what this means for a democracy.