Extraordinary Measures: Protesting Rule of Law Violations After Bush v. Gore

Law and Philosophy -     

Candidate Character vs. The Economy in the 1992 Election

The outcome of the 1992 U.S. presidential election has been explained largely as a function of perceptions of George Bush's economic performance. The economy submerged questions about Bill Clinton's character, awarding the advantage to the Democrat. In this article, we evaluate the effect of economic evaluations along with character attacks on candidate support in the 1992 presidential contest. Claims that the economy submerged character have been somewhat exaggerated. But while character remains an important issue in presidential evaluation, its role in judging candidates cannot be taken at face value. We show that both economic evaluations and character judgments are highly politicized. The findings indicate that those protesting Clinton's character turned almost exclusively to Bush. Those protesting Bush's economic record turned to both Perot and Clinton. Still, the economy did not trump character. The troubles of both major party candidates fueled a strong protest vote that contributed to Perot's strong showing.     

Incentives for pollution abatement: Regulation,regulatory threats,and non‐governmental pressures

In the last decade, voluntary efforts by firms to reduce their environmental impacts have received increasing attention from both policymakers and scholars. This article discusses polluters' incentives to reduce their releases. In particular, using data from Canada's National Pollutant Release Inventory, it examines the impacts of conventional regulation, threats of regulation, and non‐governmental pressures facilitated by public dissemination of information about pollutant releases. The vast majority of reductions reported to the inventory to date were found not to be voluntary, as has often been assumed, but are, rather, the result of direct regulation of a relatively small number of polluters. Strong effects of federal regulation were found among other sources, as well, with much weaker responses to the mere threat of regulation. However, of concern are the growth of less visible waste streams—such as land disposal and underground injection—as well as transfers of wastes to other communities. Finally, evidence is reported that some waste streams are increasing in toxicity, an effect that may outweigh the benefits of reductions in releases. © 2003 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Legislative Transparency and Credit Risk

Open governance requirements are designed to improve accountability, which implies that transparent governments are more trustworthy stewards of their publicly invested power. However, transparency may also reduce institutional effectiveness and inhibit political compromise, diminishing the capacity to manage resources responsibly. We assess empirical support for these competing perspectives in the context of American state legislatures, many of which have become exempt from state sunshine laws in recent decades. We leverage variation in the timing of these legislative exemptions to identify the effect of removing transparency in a crucial governing institution on investors’ risk perceptions of states’ general obligation bonds. Our analysis of these data during the period 1995–2010 suggests that removing legislative transparency reduces state credit risk. We conclude that while openness in government may be normatively desirable, shielding legislative proceedings from public view may actually be better for states’ debt repayment capacity, improving their overall fiscal health.     

The Responsible Migrant,Reading the Global Compact on Migration

Law and Critique - In 2016, the international community, in reaction to the growing number of ‘tragedies’ occurring as people attempted to move across borders, met to discuss large...