Changing Sides or Changing Minds? Party Identification and Policy Preferences in the American Electorate

Scholars have long debated the individual-level relationship between partisanship and policy preferences. We argue that partisanship and issue attitudes cause changes in each other, but the pattern of influence varies systematically. Issue-based change in party identification should occur among individuals who are aware of party differences on an issue and find that issue to be salient. Individuals who are aware of party differences, but do not attach importance to the issue, should evidence party-based issue change. Those lacking awareness of party differences on an issue should show neither effect. We test our account by examining individuals' party identifications and their attitudes on abortion, government spending and provision of services, and government help for African Americans using the 1992-94-96 National Election Study panel study, finding strong support for our argument. We discuss the implications of our findings both for the microlevel study of party identification and the macrolevel analysis of partisan change.     

Selecting Committees

In selecting a committee, voters are often concerned with the over all composition of the committee rather than simply selecting a single individual as their representative. We give two examples of elections at Wheaton College in Massachusetts that illustrate the complexity of preferences that voters may have for the relationships among the individual candidates. These preferences cannot be separated into preferences on the individual candidates and are not detectable from only a voter's top-ranked committee. We outline the questions this raises for the design of committee elections in general and propose directions for future work.     

Managing Risk and Regulation in European Food Safety Governance

This article focuses on the state of European food safety governance and offers a view on possible future courses of regulatory policymaking. We begin by examining the deficiencies of the current multilevel governance system in European Union (EU) food safety policy, with an empirical focus on Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) systems. We then submit that a regulatory agency model (centralization) might perform better than multilevel governance or renationalization in terms of reducing business uncertainty, promoting food safety enhancing innovation, and improving consumer trust in the food supply. Hence it would make European food markets more resilient to recurrent food safety crises. We also argue that the EU's precautionary approach as applied to some areas of food safety risks is tied to legitimacy enhancing objectives of EU institutional actors. Assuming that supply‐side rents will change over time, we submit that emphasis of regulatory impact analysis (i.e., cost benefit considerations) is likely to increase.     

Quantum Change in the Fragmented Metropolis: Political Environment and Homeless Policy in New York City

The dominant paradigm for understanding urban policy change has long been that of “incrementalism.” The incrementalist argument is that institutional fragmentation reduces coordination, and thus discourages what might be called “nonincremental” or “quantum” change. This article seeks to test the incrementalist understanding of urban political change. Is it possible that under certain circumstances fragmentation can encourage quantum change? We will test this possibility with an analysis of homeless policy in New York City. Briefly put, over the last 25 years homeless policy in New York City has developed in a series of quantum jumps with dramatic, short‐term changes in funding, administration, and policy “philosophy.” Policy change followed this trajectory even though New York City's political environment is notoriously fragmented. This pattern contradicts what incrementalism would predict, and therefore suggests that that paradigm must be modified. Urban politics, this study suggests, can sometimes display the nonincremental, entrepreneurial, and “ideational” characteristics that have been identified as typical of the national “new politics of public policy.”     

Containing Contagious Financial Crises: The Political Economy of Joint Intervention into the Asian Crisis

The notion of contagion has changed the wayscientists perceive financial crises,causing heated debate on the politicaleconomy of crisis intervention. Based on aformal model that shows how a financialcrisis can escalate and spread contagiously,this article analyzes game-theoreticallyhow a financial market crisis can becontained through intervention. The centralfocus is the role that internationalorganizations play in overcoming thecollective action problem of jointintervention. It is argued that the IMFsupport programs were helpful, and probablynecessary in a class of cases we analyzemore carefully, in surpassing the thresholdlevel of collective action.     

To Give or Not to Give: Modeling Individuals' Contribution Decisions

Employing data from a recent national survey on campaign finance, we examine the contribution behavior of individual citizens in the 2000 election. By disaggregating types of contributions, our model enables us to observe potential heterogeneity in the determinants of giving money to parties and candidates. We find that for both types of contributions, the effects of informational resources and solicitation on the decision to contribute outweigh those of financial resources. In addition, we propose both a theoretical and an empirical distinction between the selection effects of solicitation and the stimulus effects of solicitation. By distinguishing between these dual dimensions of solicitation, our analysis provides new insight into the causal linkages between income, solicitation, and contributions. We find that while solicitation increases the likelihood of contributing through selective targeting or rational prospecting, it also does so through a stimulus mechanism.     

Gubernatorial Use of the Item Veto for Narrative Deletion

Legislative use of narrative, such as conditions and riders, in appropriations bills has become common and has had negative consequences for the executive budget and veto, as well as for the legislative process. Some governors have used the item veto as a remedy. While they have not necessarily diminished the amount of narrative, they have achieved some protection of the executive budget and veto power. Their success depends greatly on the type of legal authority embodied in this constitutional power.     

A Strategy to Prevent Losses in Local Government Investment Pools

In the first half of the 1990s, some local government investment pools (LGIPs) suffered losses from derivatives investments. Although the losses came from derivatives, the actual cause of the losses was the violation of public-fund prudent investment practices. This article provides a strategy to prevent future losses for LGIPs' participants by looking at the pattern of return on investment of the pools. Our proposal is that rates of return on state pools that co-move with market rates are generally an indication of adherence to prudent investment practices. We demonstrate the viability of this proposal by using co-integration methodology. The implication is that if rates of return on a state pool do not co-move with market rates, they may indicate the violation of prudent investment practices.