The rights and wrongs of robotics: Ethics and robots in public organizations

Some electronics experts believe that robots, like present‐day computers, will be commonplace. A diverse assortment of robots, with varying purposes, capacities, forms, and sizes, is emerging with significant implications for the policy, service and regulatory responsibilities of government. This paper explores three public policy fields – aging, health care and defence – where the use of robotics is already substantial or where it is projected to grow substantially and where significant ethical issues exist or are anticipated. Applying ethical theories to the use of robotics is difficult. In the near‐term, the focus should be on the ethical standards and behaviour of those designing, manufacturing, programming and operating robots. Several key topics in contemporary public sector ethics, including personal moral responsibility, privacy and accountability, are central to the emerging field of robot ethics. This suggests developing an ethics regime for robotics and examining the need for laws and regulations governing its use.     

The Directions of Constitutional Change: Implications for the Public Sector

Constitutional change is in the air and this applies to the constitutional system, not just the documents that we call the Commonwealth and state constitutions in Australia. The causes of change are multitudinous but two warrant special mention: (a) natural or endemic change in the economy and society at large, and (b) political causes.     

Rational Choice and Politics

The rational-choice approach brings scientific deductive methods to bear on politics. Appropriate methods are derived from physics, when actors interact probabilistically but non-rationally, and from game theory when they interact rationally. Collective action problems occur in the provision of public goods. As policies are themselves public goods, this leads to the game-theoretic analysis of voting, bureaucracy and lobbies. It is inconsistent to believe that economic actors are basically self-interested but that political actors are not. Rather, one should treat people as equally (not necessarily wholly) self-interested in each sphere. The paradoxes of social choice are then shown to have important implications for political science.     

Do bonus offers shorten unemployment insurance spells? results from the washington experiment

Unemployment insurance is intended to reduce hardship by providing labor force members with partial wage replacement during periods of involuntary unemployment. However, in performing this income maintenance function, unemployment insurance may prolong spells of unemployment. Evidence from a field experiment conducted in Illinois in 1984 suggested that offering unemployment insurance claimants a modest cash bonus for rapid reemployment would increase the speed of return to work and reduce program costs. In 1988 a similar experiment, examining several different bonus offers, was conducted in the state of Washington. Evidence from the Washington experiment indicates that bonus offers do change job seeking behavior, but that only relatively generous bonus offers—about six times the weekly benefit amount—should be expected to significantly change the behavior of people eligible for unemployment benefits.     

On democracy and debt

As we explained there is really little a priori reasoning for a clear prediction that authoritarian regimes will incur more foreign debt. In fact, some other empirical literature reveals that such regimes will face a higher supply price for such debt. Anderson presents a study of a single year using an admittedly crude measure of authoritarianism that finds that such regimes do issue more debt.This study provides a fuller examination of the empirical relationship between foreign debt and the nature of the polity's regime. Utilizing a continuous democracy variable and a continuous political liberty variable, it tests the relationship between debt and political variables. It finds little empirical support for the thesis that democracy or autocracy influence foreign debt levels. Generally the continuous variables are not significant if we use a linear in the logs specification. While a linear specification obtains results more consistent with the idea that level of democracy decreases debt, it also obtains results even less favorable to the idea that extreme forms of autocracy increase debt.