Britannia waived the rules: The Major government and the 1994 Rwandan genocide

Ten years after the 1994 Rwandan genocide occurred, seriousquestions remain about the circumstances of the British government'sresponse. This article critically evaluates the response ofJohn Major's government to the genocide. It does so in fourstages. The first section provides a brief overview of the Majorgovernment's international agenda in 1994, focusing on Britishpolicy towards the war in Bosnia and the African continent ingeneral. The second section deals with the substance of Britain'sRwanda policy, while the third discusses the ways in which thispolicy has been almost totally omitted from mainstream accountsof this period. The final section provides a critical evaluationof some of the tactics that British officials employed to avertcriticism of their government's policies. Based on the evidencepresented we conclude that the British government displayeda deeply troubling indifference towards the victims of Rwanda'sgenocide.     

MANITOBA'S ACCESS ASSISTANCE PROJECT

Reported in this article is an innovative access project in Manitoba. This project is ongoing and is designed to strengthen parenting skills and reduce the anger inherent in the breakup of any relationship.     

Coronial Inquests,Indigenous Suicide and the Colonial Narrative

Critical Criminology - This article explores the over-representation of Indigenous people in suicide statistics internationally as indicative of the broader impacts of colonialism. The purpose of...     

The European Union in Sudan: A Missed Opportunity?

Abstract

International organisations active in Africa are often criticised for their ineffectiveness. So too is the European Union (EU), which is also accused of failing to assume a more prominent conflict management role in war-torn countries. This article examines the EU’s capacity and readiness to take on such a role in one such country, the former Republic of Sudan, home to Africa’s longest-running civil wars and the first ‘genocide’ of the 21st century. It begins by outlining the EU’s record in Darfur and the North–South Peace Process. Drawing upon 25 interviews and Hill’s ‘capabilities–expectations model’, it then questions whether the EU’s ‘capabilities’ (resources, instruments, unity) were ‘fit for purpose’ in Sudan’s hostile target setting. It concludes by identifying settings that have been more propitious for a conflict-related management function and by suggesting that the EU should better manage expectations about future security roles.